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Advances in technology, as well as regulatory and legislative actions (e.g., 
Regulation Fair Disclosure, Sarbanes-Oxley, new NYSE and NASDAQ requirements) 
have led to an increase in the quantity of information available to the public. In this 
dissertation, I describe two experiments that examine the effects of information 
quantity and consistency (holding information quality constant) on the judgments and 
trading behavior of unsophisticated investors. I find that increasing the quantity and 
the consistency of information causes unsophisticated investors to show greater 
confidence and trading aggressiveness. This relation is not explained by an increase in 
cognitive effort, suggesting a direct effect of information quantity on confidence. The 
effect of increased quantity reduces investors’ expected and actual wealth in simulated 
experimental markets, while the effect of consistency on wealth depends on whether 
the additional, low-quality signals are consistent or inconsistent with the high-quality 
signal investors receive. Results highlight possible negative consequences of increased 
disclosure, and suggest directions for future experimental and archival research. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines how the confidence and wealth of unsophisticated 
investors are affected by changes in the quantity and consistency of their information, 
holding constant the quality (i.e., diagnosticity) of that information. I conduct two 
experiments in which student investors receive accounting signals for a number of 
firms, make predictions about the future performance of each firm, and provide 
reservation prices and trading decisions based on their predictions. Results of the first 
experiment show that unsophisticated investors are significantly more confident in 
their judgments (i.e., they provide more extreme reservation prices) and more 
aggressive in their trading behavior (i.e., they trade more shares) when either the 
quantity or the consistency of their signals is increased. Results of the second 
experiment indicate that the effect of information quantity on confidence is not 
mediated by investors’ cognitive effort, supporting a direct quantity effect on 
confidence.  
My experiments also allow me to simulate single-period markets in which 
unsophisticated investors trade with “sophisticated” investors who know the 
diagnosticity of their information. Results indicate that increasing information quantity 
(holding information quality constant) reduces unsophisticated investors’ wealth. 
Increasing information consistency increases unsophisticated investors’ wealth when 
low-quality signals are consistent with the high-quality signal, but decreases 
unsophisticated investors’ wealth when low-quality signals are inconsistent with the 
high-quality signal.  
  I examine information quantity and consistency because they are relevant 
features of the current financial reporting environment. Recent regulatory and 
legislative interventions (e.g., Regulation Fair Disclosure [hereafter, “Reg FD”], the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, new NYSE and NASDAQ requirements), as well as the 
advance of the Internet, have led to an increase in the quantity of available information 
about publicly-traded firms (Iglesias 2003). However, this increase in information 
quantity may not be matched by a commensurate increase in information quality 
(Bassett and Storrie 2003; Byrnes 2002; D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer 2001; Štraser 
2002). Furthermore, managers are likely to disclose information that tells a coherent, 
consistent story, even if much of that information is of low quality, so information 
consistency may also have increased over time.  
The psychology literature suggests that information quantity and consistency 
are likely to be salient features that are relied on by unsophisticated investors who lack 
the knowledge and expertise necessary to distinguish between low- and high-quality 
information. Prior psychology research has shown that increasing the quantity of 
signals available for making a judgment increases confidence, often without a 
corresponding increase in accuracy (Oskamp 1965; Ryback 1967). My experiments 
extend this literature by showing an effect of quantity even in an investment setting 
where decision makers have monetary incentives and know that more sophisticated 
investors also exist in the market. Prior psychology research has also hypothesized 
(but not shown) that confidence increases with signal consistency (see Peterson and 
Pitz 1988). I examine an investment setting in which consistency is a salient feature of 
investors’ information, and I find strong evidence of the predicted effect.  
In the first experiment, I manipulate information quantity, while holding 
information quality constant, by providing additional, nondiagnostic (i.e., low-quality) 
signals in the information sets of half of the firms that investors evaluate. Specifically, 
investors receive two signals for each firm in the “low-quantity” condition and four 
signals for each firm in the “high-quantity” condition. Regardless of quantity 
condition, the quality (i.e., the predictive value) of the information sets is held 
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constant. I manipulate information consistency by varying the level of directional 
agreement among the signals. This experimental approach allows me to separate the 
effects of information quality, quantity, and consistency, which are typically 
confounded in archival data. It also allows me to examine two separate measures of 
investor confidence: reservation prices (which reflect confidence in absolute accuracy) 
and trading aggressiveness (which reflects confidence in relative accuracy). These 
features allow for clear inferences about the effects of information quantity and 
consistency on judgment confidence. 
The results indicate that unsophisticated investors rely on information quantity 
and consistency when determining both their confidence and their aggressiveness. 
Mediating variables analyses show that the effects of quantity and consistency on 
unsophisticated investors’ aggressiveness occur via their effects on confidence, 
suggesting that increased confidence in absolute accuracy generates increased 
confidence in accuracy relative to sophisticated investors.  To examine how 
information quantity and consistency affect the wealth of unsophisticated investors, I 
also obtain data from “sophisticated” investors who perform the same task as 
unsophisticated investors but are given guidance about the predictive value of the 
signals they receive (unsophisticated investors do not receive any guidance). 
Sophisticated investors always receive the high-quantity signal set. Investor 
sophistication and quantity of information is common knowledge to all investors. This 
approach allows me to simulate single-period clearinghouse markets by aggregating 
the reservation prices and trading decisions of all investors to determine market prices 
and compensate investors according to their trading gains and losses. It also allows me 
to examine the wealth effects of important aspects of the adoption of Reg FD. 
Specifically, unsophisticated investors in the low-quantity condition face both an 
informational and an analytical disadvantage relative to sophisticated investors, while 
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unsophisticated investors in the high-quantity condition face only an analytical 
disadvantage (because all investors receive the same number of signals). Therefore, I 
can examine the effect on unsophisticated investors of shifting to a “level 
informational playing field,” as anticipated under Reg FD. I first compute expected 
wealth transfers by determining unsophisticated investors’ trading gains or losses 
under the assumption that sophisticated investors trade optimally on their information. 
Results show that unsophisticated investors systematically transfer wealth to 
sophisticated investors, and that wealth transfers are influenced by both the quantity 
and the consistency of the signals they receive. Specifically, unsophisticated investors’ 
losses are greater when they receive more signals, and are also greater when the low-
quality signals investors receive are consistent with each other but are inconsistent 
with the high-quality signal they receive. The results from analyses of actual wealth 
transfers are similar to those of expected wealth transfers, except that the effect of 
information quantity does not reach statistical significance.  
Overall, my results suggest that the current higher-quantity information 
environment may impair the welfare of unsophisticated investors, who are often 
intended to be the primary beneficiaries of regulations calling for greater disclosure 
(Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] 2000). Challenges to the “more is 
better” approach to information quantity usually cite evidence on information 
overload, wherein limits to information processing capacity lead to lower-quality 
decisions beyond a critical level of signal quantity (see Paredes 2003). My approach is 
different. I show that increased information quantity can impair performance through 
purely psychological forces that increase confidence without increasing accuracy, and 
can therefore lead to welfare losses. I provide evidence that this result arises not from 
information overload, but from systematic reliance on information quantity and 
consistency as determinants of confidence in circumstances where those variables are 
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not correlated with information quality.  
Some of these results are consistent with unsophisticated investors behaving 
rationally under the naive assumption that all information is of high quality. However, 
other results indicate reactions to information quantity and consistency that are not 
rational but that are predicted from the psychology literature. Specifically, I find that 
investors respond to a higher quantity of inconsistent information by providing more 
extreme judgments (and by trading more shares). This response is not rational (a larger 
but no less ambiguous information set should render a judge equally or less confident), 
yet it is consistent with the psychological theory that increasing the quantity of 
information leads to greater judgment confidence (this result also highlights the 
benefit of separating and independently examining the effects of information quantity 
and consistency). An alternative explanation for the quantity effect in the low 
consistency condition is the possibly mediating role of cognitive effort. To test this 
explanation, the second experiment mirrors the first except that data on individual 
effort is collected in order to test for a mediating effect. The primary results of the 
second experiment replicate those of the first.  However, consistent with a pure 
“quantity effect,” I find no evidence that cognitive effort mediates the effect of 
information quantity on unsophisticated investors’ judgment confidence.  
This research contributes to the behavioral accounting and psychology 
literatures on the sources of miscalibration and its effects. Previous research has 
studied features of the information environment and confidence in financial judgments 
(e.g., Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson 1999, 2003). This dissertation complements 
these studies by identifying information quantity and consistency as specific 
determinants of miscalibration in financial judgments. Also, prior research suggests 
that confidence in judgments may not necessarily transfer to confidence in decisions 
(Bukszar 2003). This dissertation addresses this issue by showing effects of quantity 
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and consistency on confidence in both absolute accuracy (as measured by reservation 
prices) and relative accuracy (as measured by trading aggressiveness).  
  This dissertation also contributes to the literature on the effects of confidence 
on wealth in financial markets. Prior research shows that unsophisticated investors 
tend to be overconfident, trade too much, and transfer wealth to more-informed 
investors (Barber and Odean 2000; Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson 1999). I contribute 
to this stream of research by drawing on literature from psychology to address specific 
features of the information environment that affect the confidence, calibration (i.e., 
appropriateness of confidence), and aggressiveness of unsophisticated investors’ 
judgments. My results show that informational equality causes unsophisticated 
investors to transfer more wealth to sophisticated investors because they fail to 
appreciate their analytical disadvantage. Thus, increasing unsophisticated investors’ 
ability to distinguish between high- and low-quality information, or to better 
understand the implications of their analytical disadvantage, may improve their 
welfare more than increasing the quantity of information available to them. 
Alternatively, unsophisticated investors who fall prey to the effects documented here 
may be better off relying on the summarized and filtered information that comes from 
information intermediaries such as financial analysts, rather than trying to interpret 
and act on what is often raw and unfiltered information that comes directly from the 
firms (Securities Industry Association [SIA] 2001).  
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews 
the relevant literature and presents the hypotheses. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the 
method and results of experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Chapter 5 concludes the 
dissertation with an overall discussion of the results, including limitation, extensions, 
and implications.  
  
CHAPTER 2.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1  INVESTOR SOPHISTICATION 
One way in which unsophisticated investors differ from sophisticated investors 
is in the amount of knowledge they have about the appropriate signs and weights to 
apply to different signals when making forecasts and other predictions (see Bonner, 
Walther, and Young 2003). Professional analysts and other sophisticated investors 
have more experience with predicting firm performance (Potter 1992; Yunker and 
Krehbiel 1988), as well as greater resources to develop models and formulas for 
making their predictions (Opdyke 2000). Therefore, for purposes of this study, 
information quality is defined as its diagnosticity, or predictive value, and 
sophisticated investors are defined as those who have more knowledge of information 
diagnosticity (Salthouse 1991). 
 
2.2  THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
  A great deal of regulatory and legislative activity in recent years has focused 
on increasing the amount of financial information available, particularly to smaller, 
less-sophisticated investors. For example, Reg FD was enacted in 2000 with the goal 
of eliminating selective disclosure, and was expected to give individual investors 
access to a greater quantity of material information (SEC 2000). In 2002, Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, requiring greater disclosure about such issues as 
company audit committees, executive compensation, and management conflicts of 
interest (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA] 2002). The New 
York Stock and NASDAQ exchanges have also issued requirements that call for 
greater disclosure of such issues as governance guidelines and audit qualifications 
(Goodwin Procter 2003). In addition, the advance of the Internet has reduced the cost 
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to firms of disclosing large amounts of information (VanGetson 2004). Consistent 
with expectations, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that the quantity of 
publicly available information has increased (Bailey et al. 2003; Byrnes 2002; Heflin, 
Subramanyam, and Zhang 2003; Iglesias 2003; Štraser 2002; Unger 2001). 
While the increase in information quantity is relatively undisputed, the effect 
of these changes on the overall quality of information remains in question. Opponents 
of Reg FD argued that firms would respond to the regulation by communicating large 
amounts of irrelevant information (Bailey et al. 2003; SIA 2001). Bassett and Storrie 
(2003) similarly argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other political measures 
would cause an increase in the quantity but not necessarily the quality of financial 
reports. Štraser (2002) reports an increase in information asymmetry between more- 
and less-sophisticated investors since Reg FD, consistent with the quality of public 
information not increasing with quantity. Also, other studies provide evidence of 
increased information gathering effort by analysts and increased forecast dispersion 
(Agrawal and Chadha 2003; Bailey et al. 2003; Irani and Karamanou 2003; Mohanram 
and Sunder 2003; Shane, Soderstrom, and Yoon 2002). On the other hand, Heflin, 
Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) do not find evidence consistent with impairment of 
the information environment, and some of their results are consistent with 
improvement. The objective of this study is not to determine whether information 
quality has increased post-FD; rather, I control for information quality so as to 
independently examine the effects of changes in information quantity and consistency. 
These variables would be difficult to deconfound using archival methods.  
 
2.3  INFORMATION AND INVESTOR CALIBRATION 
An environment characterized by more, but not better, information is unlikely 
to improve the accuracy of unsophisticated investors’ judgments, and may impair it, 
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because investors tend to overweight low-quality information (Bloomfield, Libby, and 
Nelson 2000; Griffin and Tversky 1992). This by itself may not pose a problem if 
unsophisticated investors are aware of any impairment and adjust their investment 
activity accordingly. However, a salient increase in information quantity may affect 
the confidence with which unsophisticated investors make those decisions in ways that 
adversely affect their welfare. 
  The relation between judgment accuracy and confidence is called calibration 
in the judgment and decision making literature. Individual miscalibration commonly 
takes the form of overconfidence; i.e., individuals generally overestimate the precision 
of their knowledge or the extent of their abilities. Miscalibration has been shown 
among professionals as well as nonprofessionals, in a variety of tasks including 
individual knowledge, predictions of behavior or performance, personality 
impressions, and eyewitness testimony (Alba and Hutchinson 2000; Barber and Odean 
1999; Dunning et al. 1990; Klayman et al. 1999; Swann and Gill 1997; Wells and 
Murray 1984). Of particular relevance for the study of unsophisticated investors, 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) find that the least accurate individuals are typically the 
least calibrated. In sum, the literature shows that confidence is influenced by factors 
other than accuracy, such that miscalibration is a common feature of individual 
judgment. 
 
2.3.1  Information Quantity and Calibration 
  The quantity of information available for making a judgment has been shown 
to affect confidence (Gill, Swann, and Silvera 1998; Paese and Sniezek 1991). 
Additional information tends to increase confidence, even when it does not increase 
accuracy (Oskamp 1965). 
  My experiment focuses on circumstances where unsophisticated investors 
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receive information of greater quantity, but not greater quality. Because these 
investors are relatively less able to distinguish diagnostic from nondiagnostic 
information, they are unlikely to recognize the low quality of their additional 
information. Rather, they are likely to assume that more information implies a higher-
quality information set, and as a result show greater confidence, but not greater 
accuracy, in their judgments.     
 
H1a:  Unsophisticated investors’ confidence increases as signal 
quantity increases. 
 
H1b:  Unsophisticated investors’ calibration decreases as signal 
quantity increases.  
 
2.3.2  Information Consistency and Calibration 
  Another factor that may influence investors’ confidence is the consistency of 
the information they receive. Gill, Swann, and Silvera (1998) argue that if information 
is consistent in its implications, the individual’s mental representation is likely to be 
richer, producing greater confidence. Peterson and Pitz (1988) suggest that 
consistency should affect an individual’s confidence to the extent that he or she 
believes it affects the accuracy of his or her judgments. However, they do not find a 
significant effect of consistency on confidence (see their experiment 4), and attribute 
their lack of results to information consistency not being a salient feature of their 
experimental setting. Information consistency is likely to be a salient feature of 
unsophisticated investors’ information in trading contexts, so my experimental setting 
provides a more powerful test of the effect of information consistency on judgment 
confidence.
  If managers increase the quantity of information in public disclosures by 
including more low-quality information, it is likely that they will try to convey a 
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consistently favorable impression of the firm. To the extent that unsophisticated 
investors fail to recognize and ignore low-quality information, their judgments, and 
their confidence in those judgments, are likely to be affected by the consistency of the 
information they receive, with high consistency information sets producing relatively 
high judgment confidence. However, the effects of consistency on calibration will 
depend on how consistency relates to the high-quality information in the set. If an 
information set as a whole is consistent with the high-quality information contained 
therein, reliance on consistency should improve calibration. If an information set is 
inconsistent (on the whole) with the high-quality information contained therein, 
reliance on consistency should reduce calibration. Thus, I anticipate the largest 
reduction in calibration when an information set is of relatively high consistency but 
conflicts directionally with the high-quality information.  
 
H2a:  Unsophisticated investors’ confidence increases as signal 
consistency increases. 
 
H2b:  Unsophisticated investors’ calibration increases with the degree 
of directional agreement between the information set as a whole 
and the high-quality signal contained therein. 
 
2.4  TRADING AGGRESSIVENESS AND WEALTH EFFECTS 
The confidence investors have in their financial judgments is a key factor in 
the aggressiveness with which they participate in the capital markets (Bloomfield, 
Libby, and Nelson 1996). Thus, the calibration of those judgments should be a key 
factor in determining their trading profits. Prior research provides evidence that 
miscalibration can be costly. For example, Barber and Odean (2000) analyze actual 
trade data and find evidence that individual investors are overconfident in their own 
opinions, which causes them to trade too much and suffer reduced returns as a result. 
In an experimental study, Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson (1999) find that less-
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informed investors are overconfident and consequently transfer wealth to more-
informed investors who are able to develop more accurate estimates of security values. 
Similarly, an increase in information quantity and consistency may cause 
unsophisticated investors to feel more confident not only in their absolute accuracy, 
but in their accuracy relative to sophisticated investors, which should be reflected in 
more aggressive trading behavior.  
 
H3a:  Unsophisticated investors trade more shares as signal quantity 
increases.  
 
H3b:  Unsophisticated investors trade more shares as signal 
consistency increases. 
 
  The effects of information quantity and consistency have economic 
implications for investors. I expect unsophisticated investors to be generally 
miscalibrated given their disadvantage relative to sophisticated investors, and to 
transfer wealth as a result. However, unsophisticated investors’ wealth transfers 
should track their calibration and aggressiveness, which I hypothesize are affected by 
the quantity and consistency of investors’ information.   
 
H4a:  Unsophisticated investors transfer wealth to sophisticated 
investors. 
 
H4b:  Unsophisticated investors transfer more wealth to sophisticated 
investors as signal quantity increases.  
 
H4c:  Unsophisticated investors’ wealth transfers to sophisticated 
investors decrease with the degree of directional agreement 
between the information set as a whole and the high-quality 
signal contained therein. 
  
CHAPTER 3.  EXPERIMENT 1 
 
3.1      METHOD 
3.1.1  Overview 
I conduct an experiment in which forty-eight MBA and Masters of Accounting 
students make predictions and trading decisions for twenty-four firms based on 
accounting information from a given year. Participants (hereafter “investors”) predict 
whether each firm’s Return on Equity (ROE) in the following year will be above or 
below the median ROE of a large sample of public firms, provide reservation prices 
for securities of the firms, and indicate the number of shares they want to buy at prices 
below their reservation prices and sell at prices above their reservation prices. 
Investors do not interact in real time markets, yet these data allow me to determine the 
market results that would occur if interaction took place. 
 
3.1.2  Experimental Design 
Thirty-two investors serve as unsophisticated investors in a 2 × 4 incomplete 
factorial design, shown in Table 1. Signal consistency is manipulated within subjects 
at four levels; signal quantity is manipulated within subjects at two levels. Information 
quality is constant in all cells of the experiment. Specifically, only one of the signals 
has significant predictive value, and it is given for all firms. The other signals are all 
of low quality, in that they are not significantly correlated with the prediction variable, 
nor do they add to the predictive value of the information set beyond the high-quality 
signal.    
To test for the predicted wealth effects, sixteen investors serve as 
“sophisticated” investors. Sophisticated investors always receive the high-quantity
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TABLE 1. 
Experimental design: 
Manipulation of unsophisticated investors’ information quantity and consistency 
 
   Low-Quantity 
   (2 signals per firm) 
Consistency*  Low (AB)        High (AA) 
# of firms  6        6 
   High-Quantity 
   (4 signals per firm) 
Consistency  Low (AABB)  Intermediate 
(ABBB) 
Intermediate 
(AAAB)  High (AAAA)
# of firms  4 2 2 4 
 
 
* “Consistency” refers to the degree to which a firm’s information set is consistent with the diagnostic 
signal. Two signals are defined as consistent if both of their values are either greater than 65 or less than 
35. For analysis purposes, each firm was assigned a consistency code. The high-quality signal (CFO to 
LT Debt Ratio) was coded as “A” and each additional signal was coded as “A” if it was consistent with 
the high-quality signal and as “B” if not. Therefore, firms whose signals were of the form AABB (or 
AB in the case of the 2-signal firms) were given a consistency value of 0 (representing low 
consistency), firms whose signals were of the form ABBB (AAAB) were given a value of 1(2), and 
firms whose signals were of the form AAAA (or AA in the case of the 2-signal firms) were given a 
value of 3 (representing high consistency).  
 
information set, and also receive guidance about the predictive power (i.e., the quality) 
of the signals that all investors receive, both individually and together with the other 
signals. The guidance includes both the correlation between each signal and the 
predicted ROE variable, and the percentage of correct predictions that would result 
from relying on each individual signal and on the information set as a whole. 
Unsophisticated investors do not receive any guidance about the quality of their 
signals, but all investors are informed of the makeup of the market setting.
1
 
                                                 
1 Including twice as many unsophisticated as sophisticated investors makes it more likely that 
unsophisticated investors can influence the market price, thereby encouraging sophisticated investors to 
exploit unsophisticated investors’ lack of knowledge of information quality.  
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3.1.3  Dependent Variables 
  For each security, investors make a binary prediction about whether the firm’s 
future ROE will be above or below the median ROE. They also provide a reservation 
price (between $0 and $1) for a security that pays $1 if ROE is above the median and 
$0 otherwise. The reservation price represents the price at which they would be 
indifferent to either buying or selling a share of the security. Finally, investors indicate 
the number of shares (between 0 and 10 shares) they would like to buy or sell.  
Confidence is measured by converting each reservation price to a probability 
judgment; for reservation prices greater than $0.50, confidence = reservation price, for 
reservation prices below $0.50, confidence = 1 – reservation price. Thus, a more 
extreme reservation price is interpreted as indicating greater absolute confidence in 
one’s prediction (Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson 2000; Ronis and Yates 1987).
2 
Aggressiveness is measured by the number of shares traded. Thus, more shares traded 
is interpreted as indicating greater relative confidence in one’s prediction. 
 
3.1.4  Independent Variables 
3.1.4.1 Information Quantity 
  Information quantity is held constant for sophisticated investors, who receive 
four signals for all twenty-four firms. Unsophisticated investors’ information quantity 
is manipulated within subjects. Unsophisticated investors receive two signals for each 
of twelve “low-quantity” firms and four signals for each of twelve “high-quantity” 
firms. The change in unsophisticated investors’ signal quantity is common knowledge 
to all investors, and the order in which unsophisticated investors receive the 2-signal 
group or the 4-signal group is balanced. 
                                                 
2 Because the reservation price is equivalent to a probability estimate, this measure of confidence is 
consistent with the psychology literature on confidence and miscalibration (see Lichtenstein, Fischoff, 
and Phillips 1982). 
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3.1.4.2 Information Consistency 
  Consistency is manipulated by varying the directional agreement of the signals. 
Two signals are defined as consistent if they agree directionally in their prediction of 
security value. In the 2-signal condition, six “high consistency” firms have consistent 
signals, and six “low consistency” firms have inconsistent signals. In the 4-signal 
condition, four high consistency firms have all four signals consistent, while four low 
consistency firms have two signals in each direction. In addition, four “intermediate 
consistency” firms have three signals in one direction and one in the other direction. 
These four firms are balanced with respect to whether or not the weight of consistency 
is in the direction of the high-quality signal.
3
 
3.1.5  Firms and Signals 
  The experimental design requires securities with the following characteristics: 
values determined by a binary variable, signals with varying predictive power, and 
signal sets for which information quality can be held constant while manipulating 
information quantity and consistency. To meet these requirements, I drew a large 
sample from the set of all firms in the Compustat database from 1998 to 2002. I coded 
a binary variable, “ROE”, equal to 1 (0) if a firm’s ROE in a given year was greater 
than (less than) the median ROE of all firms in that year. I then selected a large 
number of accounting signals based on Table 2 of Ou and Penman’s (1989, p. 304) 
study of the predictive value of financial statement items. To simplify the task and to 
increase the predictive power of the signals, I replaced the value of each signal with its 
percentile rank, equal to the percentage of all firms in that year that had lower values 
                                                 
3 Balancing the consistency of the firms in this way ensures that the correlations between each signal 
and the ROE variable for the 24 specific firms used in the experiment are relatively unchanged from 
those in the large dataset from which the securities were drawn. 
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of that signal.
4 I conducted univariate analyses to determine the power of each signal 
in predicting the value of the ROE variable. For each signal, I computed the 
percentage of firms for which that signal alone correctly predicts the value of the ROE 
variable, using a cutoff probability of 0.50.
5 The signals were selected for the 
experiment based on the results of these analyses.  
  Table 2 shows the signals received by the different investor groups, the 
correlation between each signal and the ROE variable, and the percentage of correct 
predictions for each signal and for each information set as a whole. Panel A shows that 
in the 2-signal condition, unsophisticated investors receive one high-quality signal (the 
ratio of Cash from Operations to Long-term Debt) and one low-quality signal (the 
percentage change in Gross Margin Ratio). In the 4-signal condition, shown in Panel 
B, unsophisticated investors receive the same two signals plus two additional, low-
quality signals (Inventory Turnover Ratio and Percentage Change in Working 
Capital). In addition to their quality, the signals were selected so as to appear at least 
somewhat diagnostic to an investor who lacks specific knowledge of signal quality. 
Statistically, however, the three low-quality signals are in fact nondiagnostic, as none 
are significant in predicting the ROE variable in univariate tests, and the percentage of 
correct prediction is no higher for the information set as a whole than it is for the high-
quality signal, “CFO to LT Debt Ratio” (72%).
6 Sophisticated investors receive the 4-
signal set (shown in Panel B) for all twenty-four firms.  
 
                                                 
4 For example, if a firm’s Change in Gross Margin Ratio was greater than 40% of that of all other firms 
in a given year, the value for that measure was 40 for that firm-year. 
5 For each signal, I assigned to each firm a value of 1 if the univariate analysis yielded a predicted value 
greater than 0.5 and a value of 0 if not. The percentage of correct prediction is computed as the 
percentage of firms for which this binary value matches the actual value of the ROE variable.   
6 Because these variables are used to predict a binary dependent measure, a purely nondiagnostic signal 
will predict correctly about 50% of the time on average, by pure chance. Thus, the closer a variable’s 
correct prediction percentage is to 50%, the less diagnostic that variable is.   
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3.1.6  Trading Decisions and Market Prices 
  After the experiment, I aggregate reservation prices and share numbers to 
determine the market-clearing price for each security in a clearing-house market. All 
transactions are executed at this market-clearing price, and investors are compensated 
on that basis. If an investor’s reservation price is below (above) the market price, s/he 
sells (buys) shares. After all transactions are executed, shares are converted into their 
true values, and trading gains and losses are computed for each participant.  
 
3.1.7  Instructions and Procedure 
  Investors received the experimental materials in a packet of four envelopes. 
Written instructions contained in the first envelope (shown in Appendix A) were also 
reviewed verbally by the proctor, and investors were free to ask questions publicly. 
The instructions reviewed the task, the firms, and how money could be earned. 
Investors were also informed that there were two types of investors in the market: 
Sophisticated investors (called “Type 2 investors” in the experiment) would receive 
some guidance about the explanatory power of all investors’ information, while 
unsophisticated investors (called “Type 1 investors”) would not receive any guidance. 
Investors were also informed that sophisticated investors would receive four signals 
for each firm, while unsophisticated investors would receive either two signals or four 
signals for each firm. Investors were not informed that the quantity of signals received 
by unsophisticated investors would change during the experiment.
7 They were told 
that investor type was assigned randomly, and that they would find out what type they 
                                                 
7 Whether unsophisticated investors received the 2- or 4-signal group first was balanced. However, in 
order to discuss verbally the differences between unsophisticated and sophisticated investors, it was 
necessary to separate the unsophisticated investors who received the 2-signal group first from those 
who received the 4-signal group first. Therefore, sessions with each group of unsophisticated investors 
were conducted separately. Investors were randomly assigned to treatments and sessions. 
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TABLE 2. 
Information signals 
 
Panel A: Signals received by unsophisticated investors in the 2-signal condition: 
 
Accounting measure 
Correlation with 
prediction 
variable  
Percentage of 
correct prediction 
when using the 
measure perfectly 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio  0.439 72% 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin 
Ratio  0.087 59% 
    
Entire information set  0.450 72% 
 
Panel B: Signals received by unsophisticated investors in the 4-signal condition, and 
by sophisticated investors for all firms: 
 
Accounting measure 
Correlation with 
prediction 
variable  
Percentage of 
correct prediction 
when using the 
measure perfectly 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio  0.439 72% 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin 
Ratio  0.087 59% 
Inventory Turnover Ratio   0.080 59% 
Percentage Change in Working 
Capital   0.060 59% 
    
Entire information set (all 4 items)  0.454 72% 
 
This table presents the accounting signals received by unsophisticated and sophisticated investors. 
When unsophisticated investors were in the low-quantity condition, they received the two signals 
shown in Panel A. The signals shown in Panel B were given to unsophisticated investors in the high-
quantity condition, and to sophisticated investors for all firms. For each accounting signal, investors 
received a number representing the percentage of firms for which the value of that accounting signal 
was lower than the firm they were evaluating. Thus, all signals were percentages between 0 and 99. 
“Correlation with prediction variable” is the correlation between each signal and the binary ROE 
variable investors were predicting, estimated in the large dataset from which the experimental securities 
were drawn. “Percentage of correct prediction when using the measure perfectly” is the percentage of 
firms in the large dataset for which that signal or combination of signals correctly predicts the value of 
the binary ROE variable, using a cutoff of 0.50. Thus, if the predicted value of the ROE variable using 
the signal is less than (greater than or equal to) 0.50, the signal has a predicted binary value of 0 (1). 
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had been assigned in the second envelope. The verbal discussion allowed all investors 
to have common knowledge about the information that each investor type would 
receive. 
  In the second envelope, investors learned their assigned type and the signals 
they would receive (also shown in Appendix A). Sophisticated investors also received 
guidance (similar to Table 2) about the information sets of unsophisticated investors as 
well as their own. All investors also completed comprehension checks to ensure their 
understanding of the materials, their assigned investor type, and how investor types 
differed. Sophisticated investors were also asked about the explanatory power of the 
signals.  
  The third envelope contained the first twelve firms. After reviewing the signals 
for a firm, investors were asked to predict whether the firm’s ROE in the next year 
would be above or below the median ROE of all firms in the database in the next year. 
They were then asked to provide, on a continuous scale, a reservation price (called a 
“cutoff price”) for shares of securities of the firm. Investors were constrained to select 
a reservation price in the range ($0, $0.50) if they had predicted below-median ROE 
and in the range ($0.50, $1) if they had predicted above-median ROE. This was 
explained as reflecting that the reservation price was an expression of the probability 
that future ROE would be above median ROE (i.e., if they predicted below-average 
ROE, they must believe that probability to be below 0.50, and vice versa). Finally, 
they were asked to indicate, on a discrete scale ranging from 0 to 10, the number of 
shares of the firm they were willing to trade. After indicating their share number, they 
immediately went on to the next firm.  
  At the end of the third envelope, all investors were informed that for the last 
twelve firms, unsophisticated investors would receive four (two) signals instead of two 
(four), and any new signals were defined. Investors were also informed that 
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sophisticated investors’ information would not change. Sophisticated investors were 
given guidance about the explanatory power of the information that unsophisticated 
investors would receive for the last twelve firms. All investors again completed 
comprehension checks to ensure their understanding of the changes, at which time 
they moved to the fourth envelope to evaluate the last set of firms. After completing 
the study, investors were asked a series of debriefing questions. 
 
3.2  RESULTS 
3.2.1  Consistency Coding 
  For each firm, I code the high-quality signal as “A”, and I code each additional 
signal as “A” if it is consistent with that signal and as “B” if not. I assign each firm a 
consistency code according to the following convention: firms whose signals are of 
the form AABB (or AB in the case of the 2-signal firms) are assigned a consistency 
value of 0 (representing low consistency), firms whose signals are of the form ABBB 
(AAAB) are assigned a value of 1(2) (representing intermediate consistency), and 
firms whose signals are of the form AAAA (or AA in the case of the 2-signal firms) 
are assigned a value of 3 (representing high consistency).  
 
3.2.2  Comprehension and Manipulation Checks 
  All participants correctly identified their assigned investor type, the number of 
signals each investor type would receive, and whether they and investors of the other 
type would receive any guidance about the predictive value of their signals. After the 
first 12 firms had been completed, all participants correctly identified the change in 
unsophisticated investors’ information.  
  Analysis of the predictive accuracy of the two investor groups serves as a 
check on the success of the sophistication manipulation. The mean absolute difference 
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between unsophisticated investors’ reservation prices and the securities’ expected 
values is 0.250; the mean absolute difference for sophisticated investors is 0.132. The 
difference is statistically significant (F = 28.67; p < .0001), suggesting that 
sophisticated investors were better able to rely on the high-quality signal when making 
their predictions, and were more accurate as a result. Thus, the manipulation of 
investor sophistication was successful. 
 
3.2.3  Effects of Information Quantity and Consistency on Unsophisticated Investors’ 
Confidence, Calibration, and Trading Aggressiveness  
  I predict that, holding information quality constant, increasing the quantity and 
consistency of unsophisticated investors’ information leads to increased judgment 
confidence and trading aggressiveness. As a result, I expect calibration and wealth to 
decrease with information quantity and with the degree to which the information set is 
inconsistent with the high-quality signal. Panel A of Table 3 shows unsophisticated 
investors’ mean confidence, calibration, and shares traded, by quantity condition and 
consistency. Figure 1 shows the means, along with the predicted patterns, graphically. 
For each of the dependent measures, I conduct a repeated measures, fixed effects 
analysis with quantity and consistency as categorical independent variables. I omit 
intermediate-consistency firms (i.e., firms coded as ABBB and AAAB) to analyze the 
effect of information quantity, as no intermediate-consistency firms are represented in 
the low-quantity condition. The results of the analyses are shown in Panel B of Table 
3. Quantity and consistency do not interact significantly in any analysis, so Panel B 
focuses on predicted main effects and contrasts. 
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3.2.3.1 Confidence 
Supporting H1a, the effect of quantity on confidence is significant (F = 9.31; 
p = 0.0024), with unsophisticated investors more confident when they receive more 
signals. Supporting H2a, the effect of consistency on confidence is also significant 
(F = 50.51; p < 0.0001). To provide a stronger test of the effect of consistency, I 
conduct a planned contrast which includes the intermediate-consistency firms (i.e., 
ABBB and AAAB firms). For this contrast, firms with signals of the form AABB, 
ABBB, AAAB, and AAAA are assigned weights of −1, 0, 0, and 1, respectively, 
corresponding to the number of consistent signals in each information set.
8 The 
contrast is significant (F = 26.05; p < 0.0001), again supporting H2a. The effect of 
consistency is not significant when the AAAA firms are eliminated. Thus, unanimity 
(i.e., all signals in the same direction) seems important for information consistency to 
affect judgment confidence (see Figure 1, Panel A).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 These and all other contrast results are robust to a number of alternative weighting conventions. 
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TABLE 3. 
Experiment 1: Effects of quantity and consistency on unsophisticated investors’ 
judgments 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics* 
   
  Low-Quantity   
Low 
Consistency 
High 
Consistency   
(AB) 
 
(AA) 
Average
Confidence  0.713     0.776  0.744 
Calibration  −0.132      −0.050  −0.091 
Shares  5.750     6.302  6.026 
  
 
High-Quantity 
 
Low 
Consistency 
Intermediate 
Consistency 
High 
Consistency   
(AABB) (ABBB)  (AAAB) (AAAA) 
Average
Confidence  0.734 0.749  0.735 0.816 0.764 
Calibration  −0.127  −0.171  −0.054  −0.068  −0.103 
Shares  6.203 6.156  6.203 7.078 6.487 
 
  
TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Fixed Effects and Contrast Analyses for H1, H2, and H3 
 
 
  Dependent Measure  Hypothesis Effect  Den df  F  p-value (one-tailed) 
H1a          Quantity 31 9.31 0.0024
H2a          Consistency 31 50.51 <  0.0001 Confidence 
H2a  Contrast: Consistency
+ 93      26.05 <  0.0001
H1b          Quantity 31 0.59 0.4469
H2b          Consistency 31 70.19 <  0.0001 Calibration 
H2b  Contrast: Consistency  93  43.51  < 0.0001 
H3a          Quantity 31 12.85 0.0006
H3b          Consistency 31 17.32 0.0001 Trading Aggressiveness 
(Shares) 
H3b  Contrast: Consistency  93  11.63  0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* “Confidence” is measured as the reservation price when it is above 0.50, and as 1 – reservation price when it is below 0.50. “Shares” represents the number 
of shares traded. “Calibration” is measured as (−1) times the squared difference between the reservation price and the expected value of the security, per 
investor, per security.  
 
# The fixed effects analyses omit firms coded as ABBB and AAAB because intermediate−consistency firms are not represented in the low-quantity condition. 
Thus, the tests analyze the 2X2 Quantity (High vs. Low) by Consistency (High vs. Low) results. All consistency levels are used in the contrast analyses.  
 
+ The weights for the consistency contrast analyses are as follows: For Confidence and Shares: AABB, −1; ABBB, 0; AAAB, 0; AAAA, 1. For Calibration 
and Wealth Transfers: ABBB, −1.5; AABB, −0.5; AAAB, 0.5; AAAA, 1.5.
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Panel A: Confidence
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FIGURE 1. 
Experiment 1: Effects of quantity and consistency on unsophisticated investors’ judgments 
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FIGURE 1 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Calibration
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FIGURE 1 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Trading Aggressiveness (Shares Traded)
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3.2.3.2 Calibration 
  Calibration is measured as the squared difference between an investor’s 
reservation price for a security and the security’s expected value. Thus, calibration 
captures the accuracy of investors’ confidence assessments. To simplify interpretation, 
I multiply this measure by −1 so that higher values indicate greater calibration.  
  Each firm’s expected value is calculated from a regression equation obtained 
from the large dataset from which the experimental securities were drawn. The 
regression equation includes an intercept and the beta coefficient associated with the 
high-quality signal. The predicted value from this equation thus represents investors’ 
optimal reservation price (given that all other signals are nondiagnostic and should be 
ignored). The use of the security’s expected value also provides a less noisy 
calibration measure than would use of the security’s actual value.
9  
  The results of the analysis of unsophisticated investors’ calibration are shown 
in Panel B of Table 3. Counter to H1b, the main effect of quantity is not significant 
(F = 0.59; p = 0.4469). This lack of a significant effect appears to be driven by the low 
consistency condition (see Figure 1, Panel B). To examine this issue further, I conduct 
simple effects tests and find that the effect of quantity is significant in the high 
consistency condition (F=4.01; p=.027), but not in the low consistency condition 
(F=0.16; p=.688). The explanation for this result lies in unsophisticated investors’ 
signal reliance. Regression analyses (not shown) indicate that unsophisticated 
investors rely considerably on the low-quality signal (Change in Gross Margin Ratio) 
when making their predictions. Because this signal is always in the opposite direction 
of the high-quality signal (CFO to LT Debt Ratio) for the AB firms, reliance causes 
unsophisticated investors to be less accurate (i.e., to show a larger difference between 
reservation price and expected value) for the AB firms than they are for the AABB 
 
9 Results are robust to alternative specifications of expected value, and also to using actual value in 
place of expected value.  
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firms, for which the two signals are not always in the opposite direction.
10 As a result, 
although confidence is higher for the AABB firms than for the AB firms, accuracy is 
also higher, leaving calibration insignificantly different between the AB and AABB 
conditions. 
Supporting H2b, the effect of consistency is significant (F = 70.19; 
p < 0.0001). To provide a stronger test that calibration increases with the degree to 
which a firm’s information set is consistent with the high-quality signal, I conduct a 
planned contrast which includes the intermediate-consistency firms (i.e., ABBB and 
AAAB firms). I expect calibration to be lowest for ABBB firms, followed (in order) 
by AABB, AAAB, and AAAA firms. Therefore, for this contrast, firms with signals of 
the form ABBB, AABB, AAAB, and AAAA are assigned weights of −1.5, −0.5, 0.5, 
and 1.5, respectively, corresponding to the number of signals that are consistent with 
the high-quality signal in each information set. The contrast is significant (F = 43.51; p 
< 0.0001; see Figure 1, Panel B), again supporting H2b. Thus, calibration increases 
with the degree to which the information set as a whole is consistent with the high-
quality signal. 
 
3.2.3.3 Trading Aggressiveness 
  Greater trading aggressiveness is indicated by trading more shares. Panel B of 
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis of unsophisticated investors’ aggressiveness. 
Supporting H3a, the effect of quantity is significant (F = 12.85; p = 0.0006). This 
evidence of increased aggressiveness in the high-quantity condition shows that 
unsophisticated investors are more confident not only in their absolute accuracy, but 
also in their accuracy relative to sophisticated investors. The effect of consistency is 
also significant (F = 17.32; p = 0.0001). I again conduct a planned contrast to test for 
 
10 Also, unsophisticated investors’ reliance on the Change in Gross Margin Ratio signal is reduced in 
the high-quantity condition. This also contributes to their increased accuracy.   
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the prediction in H3b that trading aggressiveness increases with consistency. The 
weights used for this contrast are the same as those used to test the effect of 
consistency on confidence, as the predicted pattern is the same (i.e., AABB, ABBB, 
AAAB, and AAAA firms are weighted −1, 0, 0, and 1, respectively). The contrast is 
significant (F = 11.63; p = 0.001; see Figure 1, Panel C), supporting H3b. Thus, 
trading aggressiveness increases with the quantity and the consistency of the signals.  
  To determine if quantity and consistency affect aggressiveness via their effects 
on confidence, I conduct a mediating variables analysis (not shown) using the process 
described by Baron and Kenny (1986). Univariate regression analyses confirm that 
quantity (t = 2.37; p = .017) and consistency (t = 3.20; p = .001) are both significant 
predictors of aggressiveness, as is confidence (t = 15.42; p < .0001). When all three 
variables are used in the regression equation, however, confidence remains highly 
significant (t = 15.29; p < .0001), while quantity (t = 1.65; p = .098) and consistency 
(t = 0.34 ; p = .7369) do not. Thus, confidence mediates the effects of quantity and 
consistency on aggressiveness, indicating that the increase in unsophisticated 
investors’ confidence in their absolute accuracy increased their confidence in their 
relative accuracy. 
 
3.2.4  Effects of Information Quantity and Consistency on Unsophisticated Investors’ 
Wealth  
  I compute two measures to examine wealth effects. First, I multiply the 
number of shares traded times the absolute difference between an investor’s 
reservation price for a security and the security’s expected value. This “expected 
winnings” measure captures what an unsophisticated investor could be expected to 
earn, given his or her judgments and trading decisions, by trading with a perfectly 
calibrated investor. Second, I compute “market winnings” based on the price obtained   32
in the simulated clearinghouse market. Specifically, market winnings are computed as 
the number of shares bought or sold times the difference between the market price and 
the expected value.
11 Table 4, Panel A shows mean values of both wealth measures 
(expected and market winnings), by quantity and consistency. Figure 2 shows the 
predicted patterns and actual means graphically.  
  H4c predicts that the effect of consistency on unsophisticated investors’ wealth 
will follow the same pattern as its effect on calibration; that is, I expect 
unsophisticated investors’ wealth to be lowest for ABBB firms, followed (in order) by 
AABB, AAAB, and AAAA firms. To test for this pattern, planned contrasts for both 
wealth measures use weights of −1.5, −0.5, 0.5, and 1.5, respectively.  
 
3.2.4.1 Expected Winnings  
  Panel B of Table 4 shows the results of fixed effects and contrast analyses for 
the effects of quantity and consistency on expected winnings. Supporting H4a, 
unsophisticated investors’ average expected winnings are significantly less than zero 
(t = −28.25; p < 0.0001). Supporting H4b, the effect of quantity is significant 
(F = 4.09; p = 0.0259). Supporting H4c, the effect of consistency is also significant 
(F = 22.22; p < 0.0001), and the planned contrast shows the data follow the predicted 
pattern (F = 16.38; p = 0.0001; see Figure 2, Panel A). Thus, unsophisticated 
investors’ expected winnings are lower when they receive more signals, and move 
with the degree to which the information set is consistent with the high-quality signal.   
  Simple effects analyses (not shown) indicate that the effect of quantity is 
significant in the high consistency condition (F=12.32; p=.0007) but not in the low 
consistency condition (F=0.00; p=.9799). This reflects the previous result that 
                                                 
11 Investors predicted and were paid based on a binary value (0 or 1) for each security, but measuring 
investors’ actual winnings based on each security’s expected value allows for a more accurate 
assessment of wealth effects. Similar results are obtained if based on the binary value of the security. 
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calibration is slightly improved with more information in the low consistency 
condition, such that the effect of unsophisticated investors’ increased aggressiveness 
in the high-quantity condition is offset by their slightly improved calibration, leaving 
expected winnings unchanged. 
 
3.2.4.2 Market Winnings  
  The results of the analysis of market winnings are also shown in Panel B. 
Supporting H4a, unsophisticated investors transfer wealth to sophisticated investors on 
average; the mean winnings (per unsophisticated investor, per security) of −$0.12 are 
significantly less than zero (t = −3.83; p = 0.0001). Counter to H4b, although the 
effect of quantity is in the predicted direction (with unsophisticated investors 
transferring more wealth to sophisticated investors in the high-quantity condition), it is 
not statistically significant (F = 0.17; p = 0.3413). I attribute the difference in effect of 
information quantity between expected and market winnings to decreased power from 
the noise added by sophisticated investors. Supporting H4c, the effect of consistency 
is significant (F = 8.33; p = 0.0036), and the planned contrasts show that the data 
follow the predicted pattern (F = 8.48; p = 0.0002; see Figure 2, Panel B). 
Unsophisticated investors transfer less wealth to sophisticated investors when the 
information set they receive is consistent with the high-quality signal. 
  
TABLE 4. 
Experiment 1: Unsophisticated investors’ wealth transfers 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
           
     
Information Consistency 
     
      Low        Intermediate Intermediate High
      AB / AABB  ABBB  AAAB  AA / AAAA 
Average 
      Expected*                  Market
# Expected Market Expected Market Expected Market Expected Market
Low  −1.93  −0.19          −1.17    0.03 −1.55  −0.08  Information 
Quantity  High  −1.93  −0.21  −2.41  −0.44  −1.30  −0.05  −1.63  −0.02  −1.80  −0.16 
  Average  −1.93  −0.20  −2.41  −0.44  −1.30  −0.05  −1.35    0.01 −1.68  −0.12 
 
3
4
  
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Fixed Effects and Contrast Analyses for H4 
Dependent Measure  Hypothesis  Effect  Den df  Test statistic  p-value (one-tailed) 
H4a  Overall Wealth Transfer  31   −28.25 (t)   < 0.0001 
H4b        Quantity  31 4.09  (F) 0.0259
H4c  Consistency  31  22.22 (F)  < 0.0001 
Expected Loss 
H4c  Contrast: Consistency
+ 93        16.38 (F) 0.0001
H4a  Overall Wealth Transfer  31  −3.83 (t)  0.0001 
H4b        Quantity  31 0.17  (F) 0.3413
H4c          Consistency 31 8.33  (F) 0.0036
Market Winnings 
H4c  Contrast: Consistency          93 8.48 (F) 0.0045
 
* Expected loss is measured as the number of shares traded times the absolute difference between the reservation price and the security’s expected value.  
 
# Actual loss is measured as the number of shares bought or sold times the distance between the market price (determined by aggregating unsophisticated and 
sophisticated investors’ reservation price and share numbers in a simulated clearinghouse market) and the security’s expected value. 
 
+ The weights for the consistency contrast analyses for both wealth measures are: AABB, −0.5; ABBB, −1.5; AAAB, 0.5; AAAA, 1.5. 
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Panel A: Expected winnings
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FIGURE 2. 
Experiment 1: Unsophisticated investors’ wealth transfers 
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FIGURE 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Market winnings
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3.3  DISCUSSION 
The results of experiment 1 show that unsophisticated investors are more 
confident in their judgments and more aggressive in their trading behavior when they 
receive information in greater quantity and consistency. Because the additional signals 
represent low quality information, unsophisticated investors’ increased confidence and 
aggressiveness lead them to transfer wealth to sophisticated investors who are able to 
develop more accurate estimates of security values.  
The evidence that confidence and aggressiveness increase as signal consistency 
increases, or as the quantity of consistent signals increases, can be reconciled with 
investors behaving rationally under the assumption that all information is of high 
quality. Under that assumption, the probability that the security takes the value 
suggested by the signals increases with the consistency of those signals, and with the 
quantity of consistent signals. However, the evidence that confidence and 
aggressiveness increase as the quantity of inconsistent signals increases cannot be 
explained as a rational response to the information. Statistical theory would predict 
that as the signals in an information set become more inconsistent, judgments should 
be more moderate (i.e., closer to the mean of the distribution).
12 This suggests that 
investors’ reservation prices should have been equally or less extreme in the high 
quantity, low consistency condition (AABB) compared to the low quantity, low 
consistency condition (AB). Instead, reservation prices were more extreme in the 
AABB condition.  
  This result implies a pure “quantity effect” that is independent of signal 
consistency, whereby an investor’s judgment confidence is greater when that judgment 
 
12 See Peterson and Pitz (1988). This follows from the fact that when the distributional properties of 
information are known (as they are in Experiment 1), the variance of a probability distribution should 
decrease as the number of signals increases (i.e., the denominator of the sample variance increases). If 
the signals are inconsistent, the mean of the signals (which should be taken by unsophisticated investors 
as the best estimate of the ROE probability) will shift towards the center of the distribution, and the 
variance of the probability distribution (i.e., the range of possible outcomes) should decrease as more 
signals are observed.   39 
 
is based on a greater quantity of information, even if the information is inconsistent. 
However, an alternative explanation is that the effect of quantity on confidence is 
mediated by cognitive effort; that is, that effort increases with the quantity of 
inconsistent information, and that investors base their confidence on the amount of 
effort they exert. Discriminating between these two competing explanations is the 
purpose of experiment 2. 
  
CHAPTER 4.  EXPERIMENT 2 
 
4.1       INTRODUCTION 
  The results of experiment 1 suggest that unsophisticated investors are 
influenced by a pure information quantity effect, wherein confidence is higher when 
more information is available for decision making, even when the overall information 
is directionally inconsistent. An alternative explanation for investors’ increased 
confidence involves the possibly mediating role of cognitive effort. In the next section 
I describe research relevant to both of these explanations, and then report an 
experiment designed to discriminate between them. 
 
4.2      BACKGROUND 
4.2.1  Information Quantity 
  One explanation for the quantity effect is simply that investors are more 
confident when they have access to more information. Prior psychology research 
suggests that such an effect arises because decision makers use quantity of information 
as a cue for information sufficiency (Gill, Swan, and Silvera 1998), judgment quality 
(Oskamp 1965; Peterson and Pitz 1988), and, therefore, judgment correctness. 
 
4.2.2  Cognitive Effort 
Another explanation for the quantity effect involves the role of cognitive effort 
as a possible mediator of the quantity-confidence relationship. A great deal of research 
in cognitive and social psychology has examined the role of cognitive effort in 
judgment and decision making (Fennema and Kleinmuntz 1995). Cognitive effort has 
been studied as both a dependent variable (Yates and Kulick 1977) and an independent 
variable (O’Donnell 1996), as well as a mediating variable (Creyer and Ross 1993). A 
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number of factors have been examined as determinants of cognitive effort. Incentives 
(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002), accountability (Kennedy 1993; Messier and Quilliam 
1992), and pressure (Ashton 1990) have all been shown to influence cognitive effort. 
Important for this study, prior research also shows that decision problems of greater 
complexity (i.e., more alternatives and/or more attributes) are viewed as more effortful 
(Bettman, Johnson, and Payne 1990). Kahneman (1973) also argues that the difficulty 
or complexity of a task is a strong determinant of the effort expended.   
Research in psychology has also examined the effect of effort on perceived and 
actual performance. The evidence regarding actual performance is mixed, as the effect 
depends greatly on the nature of the task; increased effort improves performance in 
some tasks but not in others (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). However, 
individuals generally perceive a positive relationship between cognitive effort and 
judgment accuracy (Yates and Kulick 1977). Therefore, they are generally more 
confident in judgments and decisions for which they have exerted more effort (Paese 
and Sniezek 1991; Shaw and Zerr 2003; Sieck and Yates 1997).
13
 
4.2.3  Competing Explanations 
  In the low consistency, low quantity (AB) condition of experiment 1, investors 
receive two signals whose values directionally conflict in their prediction of security 
value (i.e., the values are on opposite sides of 50). In the low consistency, high 
quantity (AABB) condition, investors receive four signals, with two in each direction. 
Investors in the experiment are likely to perceive their task as more complex, and 
                                                 
13 The evidence of an effort-perceived accuracy connection is consistent with the adaptive decision-
making framework of Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993), in which decision makers trade off effort 
and accuracy when processing information for a decision. Implicit in this model is the assumption that 
performance (i.e., judgment accuracy or decision appropriateness) generally increases with effort, and 
that individuals perceive such a relationship. Evidence of the effort-confidence relationship is also 
consistent with self-perception theory (Bem 1967), which argues that individuals will infer their own 
beliefs by observing their own behavior. By this account, an individual who has exerted a relatively 
high level of effort on a task may thus infer a high level of performance, resulting in a high level of 
confidence. 
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therefore requiring more effort, when they receive four conflicting signals than when 
they receive only two.
14 This perception may cause them to exert more cognitive 
effort, and to feel increased judgment confidence as a result.  
Thus, cognitive effort may mediate the effect of signal quantity on 
unsophisticated investors’ confidence in the low consistency condition. This 
explanation is distinct from the pure quantity effect I refer to earlier, because increased 
confidence (when consistency is low) would be driven not by the quantity of 
information per se, but by the perceived complexity of the task and the subsequent 
cognitive effort exerted.  
In the high consistency condition, investors receive either two (AA) or four 
(AAAA) signals, the values of which are all directionally consistent. In contrast to the 
low consistency condition, investors are unlikely to perceive their task as more 
complex when they receive four consistent signals than when they receive two. 
Rather, four consistent signals represent a stronger case in favor of one security value 
over the other, and may actually be perceived as reducing the complexity and required 
effort necessary to make a judgment (Weiner et al. 1972). Thus, in the high 
consistency setting, there may exist a negative relationship between effort and 
confidence, wherein investors perceive less complexity and subsequently exert less 
effort, but are still more confident because the evidence is stronger. At the least, signal 
quantity is unlikely to increase the perceived complexity of, and effort exerted on, the 
task when all signals are consistent. Thus, while cognitive effort may positively 
mediate the quantity-confidence relationship in the low consistency condition, it is 
                                                 
14 One issue that arises from this discussion is the range of task difficulty in which effort and difficulty 
are expected to be positively related. While Kahneman (1973) argues that task difficulty will be a strong 
determinant of effort, Weiner et al. (1972) note that the relationship may not hold at extreme levels of 
difficulty. For extremely easy tasks, effort may be perceived as unnecessary (e.g., the high-consistency 
settings of my experiment), while for extremely difficult tasks, effort may be perceived as futile. They 
argue that a strong positive relationship will most likely occur at intermediate levels of task difficulty 
(i.e., where the probability of success is around 0.5). Since my task involves a binary choice prediction, 
investors know that the probability of a correct prediction is 0.50 in all cases. Thus, I believe the low-
consistency task in my experiment is perceived to have this intermediate level of difficulty. 
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unlikely to do so in the high consistency condition. 
Experiment 2 is designed to test whether effort mediates the effect of quantity 
on confidence in the low consistency condition. In addition to conducting mediating 
variables analyses to examine the effect of effort, I conduct and report interaction and 
simple effects tests that shed additional light on the role of cognitive effort on the 
quantity-confidence relationship at both high and low levels of signal consistency. 
 
4.3      METHOD 
4.3.1  Overview and Design 
With only a few exceptions, the method used in experiment 2 is identical to 
that used in experiment 1. Fifty-two undergraduate accounting students (hereafter 
“investors”) make ROE predictions and trading decisions for the same 24 firms used 
in experiment 1. Quantity and consistency are manipulated, and “sophisticated” 
investors are proxied, all in the same manner as in experiment 1. Thirty-six (16) 
investors serve as unsophisticated (sophisticated) investors. After the experimental 
sessions, I conduct a clearinghouse market for each firm, using the reservation prices 
and share numbers provided by each investor. Trades are executed at market prices, 
shares are converted to their true values, and trading gains and losses are computed for 
each participant. 
The experiment is administered by computer rather than as a paper and pencil 
task. This allows me to measure the time each participant takes to evaluate each firm. 
Time taken per firm serves as the principal measure of effort in the analyses (Bettman, 
Johnson, and Payne 1990; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Hirst 1992). In addition, I solicit 
self-reports of effort, difficulty, and complexity for each firm from each participant. 
These assessments provide alternative measures of effort as well as insights into 
investors’ perceptions of the task.   
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4.3.2  Procedure 
  Investors received two envelopes upon entering the computer lab. The first 
envelope contained written instructions regarding the task, the firms, how money was 
earned, and how investors differed in the market. These instructions were reviewed 
verbally by the proctor, and investors were free to ask questions publicly. In the 
second envelope, investors learned their assigned investor type and the signals they 
would receive. They then answered comprehension check questions and began 
evaluating the firms, administered by the computer software.   
As in experiment 1, each investor reviewed the signals and provided, for each 
firm, a prediction about the future ROE of the firm, a reservation price, and the 
number of shares he or she wanted to trade. In addition, each investor was asked to 
rate on an 11-point scale the amount of mental effort he or she exerted while 
evaluating the firm, how difficult to correctly predict he or she thought the firm was, 
and how complex (where complex was defined as “intricate or involved”) he or she 
found the evaluation of the firm to be. After answering all the questions for a firm, 
investors could choose to go back and reevaluate the firm or proceed to the next firm.  
After the first 12 firms, investors were informed that the quantity of signals 
received by unsophisticated (i.e., “Type 1”) investors would change for the remaining 
12 firms (i.e., Type 1 investors who were receiving two (four) signals would now 
receive four (two) signals), and any new signals were defined. The investors again 
answered comprehension check questions before proceeding to the last 12 firms. After 
evaluating all the firms, investors answered a series of debriefing questions.  
 
4.4      RESULTS 
  Table 5, Panel A shows mean values of all the dependent variables for 
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unsophisticated investors. Confidence, Calibration, and Shares are measured in the 
same way as in experiment 1. Predtime refers to the average number of seconds 
investors spent on the first screen of each firm, on which they were first shown the 
signals for the firm and asked to make their ROE prediction. As this was the first 
screen on which the signals for each firm were shown, the time spent on this screen 
represents the best time-based measure of the effort exerted in evaluating the signals.
15 
I use Predtime as the principal measure of effort in the analyses. Effort, Complexity, 
and Difficulty refer to the average values of investors’ responses to 11-point Likert-
scale assessment questions.  
  The first firm seen by each investor (which was randomly assigned) served as a 
practice firm to familiarize investors with the computer interface and with the specific 
wording of the questions. Therefore, the first firm seen by each investor is deleted for 
the statistical tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 For cases where investors, after answering all the questions for a particular firm, took the option of 
returning to the first screen to reevaluate the information, the Predtime measure sums the time spent on 
the first screen across the number of times investors saw it.  
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  Low-Quantity   
Low 
Consistency
High 
Consistency   
(AB) 
 
(AA) 
Average 
Confidence  0.685     0.773  0.731 
Calibration  −0.127      −0.039  −0.081 
Shares  4.786     5.537  5.180 
Predtime  17.847     15.016  16.363 
Effort  5.301     4.602  4.935 
Complexity  5.347     4.560  4.935 
Difficulty  5.837     4.977  5.386 
  
 
High-Quantity 
 
Low 
Consistency
Intermediate 
Consistency 
High 
Consistency   
(AABB) (ABBB)  (AAAB)  (AAAA) 
Average 
Confidence  0.710 0.747  0.685  0.796 0.742 
Calibration  −0.119  −0.198  −0.041  −0.060  −0.099 
Shares  5.037 5.235  4.882  6.188 5.442 
Predtime  25.140 17.189  21.763  14.608 19.643 
Effort  5.559 4.897  5.397  4.694 5.125 
Complexity  5.632 5.265  5.588  4.734 5.255 
Difficulty  5.875 5.603  5.868  4.861 5.478 
TABLE 5. 
Experiment 2: Effects of quantity, consistency, and effort on unsophisticated 
investors’ judgments 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Effects of quantity and consistency on confidence 
 
Dependent Measure  Effect  F  p-value (one-tailed) 
Quantity    5.80  0.011
Consistency    85.17  0.000 Confidence 
Quantity × Consistency  0.00  0.500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Effects of quantity and consistency on Predtime 
 
Dependent Measure  Effect  F  p-value (one-tailed) 
Quantity    4.33  0.023
Consistency    17.65  0.000 Predtime 
Quantity × Consistency  5.45  0.013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Effects of quantity, consistency, and Predtime on confidence 
 
  Dependent Measure  Effect  F  p-value (one-tailed) 
Quantity    4.29  0.023
Predtime    12.19  0.001
Quantity × Predtime  0.08  0.387 
Consistency    61.59  0.000
Quantity × Consistency  0.04  0.425 
Predtime × Consistency  4.02  0.023 
Confidence 
Quantity × Predtime × Consistency  0.00  0.487 
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Consistency  Dependent Measure  Effect  F  p-value (one-tailed) 
Confidence Quantity  3.56    0.033
Predtime        Quantity 0.04 0.419
Confidence        Predtime 8.53 0.002
Quantity      2.29 0.070
Predtime      7.12 0.004
High 
Consistency 
Confidence 
Quantity × Predtime  0.03  0.428 
Consistency  Dependent Measure  Effect  F  p-value (one-tailed) 
Confidence Quantity  3.27    0.038
Predtime        Quantity 7.90 0.004
Confidence        Predtime 1.32 0.125
Quantity      2.92 0.048
Predtime      2.09 0.075
Low 
Consistency 
Confidence 
Quantity × Predtime  0.13  0.360 
TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel E: Simple and interactive effects in the low consistency condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: Simple and interactive effects in the high consistency condition 
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4.4.1  Effects of quantity and consistency on confidence  
I first conduct a repeated measures, fixed effects analysis to determine if the 
principal results of experiment 1 (i.e., main effects of quantity and consistency on 
confidence) are replicated in experiment 2. Panel B of Table 2 shows the results, 
which are also shown graphically in Figure 3, Panel A. As in experiment 1, 
unsophisticated investors’ confidence is higher when signal quantity (F = 5.80; one-
tailed p = 0.011) and consistency (F = 85.17; p = 0.000) are higher, and the interaction 
term is not significant (F = 0.00; p = 0.50). Thus, the principal result of experiment 1 
is replicated in experiment 2.
16 Replication indicates that changes in experimental 
protocol between experiments 1 and 2 did not drive away the effects that experiment 2 
is designed to address. 
 
4.4.2  Effects of quantity and consistency on Predtime 
I also conduct a similar analysis with Predtime as the dependent variable to 
assess the overall effects of quantity and consistency on effort. Panel C of Table 2 
shows the results, which are also shown graphically in Figure 3, Panel B. The main 
effects of quantity (F = 4.33; p = 0.023) and consistency (F = 17.65; p = 0.000) are 
significant, as well as the interaction (F = 5.45; p = 0.013). Simple effects tests (shown 
in Panels E and F of Table 5) show that the effect of quantity on Predtime is 
significant (and positive) in the low consistency condition, but not in the high 
consistency condition.  
 
                                                 
16 Additional analyses (not shown) reveal that the other results from Experiment 1 were also replicated 
in Experiment 2. Specifically, shares traded were also higher when signal quantity and consistency are 
higher. Calibration and wealth are lower when signal consistency is lower, and are lower with a greater 
quantity of signals in the high consistency condition, but not in the low consistency condition. 
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Panel A: Effects of quantity and consistency on confidence 
The Effects of Information Quantity and Consistency on 
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Panel B: Effects of quantity and consistency on Predtime 
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FIGURE 3. 
Experiment 2: Unsophisticated investors’ confidence and effort  
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FIGURE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Effects of consistency and Predtime on confidence 
 
The Effects of Information Consistency and Effort on Confidence
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Thus, consistent with the theory presented earlier, signal quantity increases effort 
when information is inconsistent, but not when it is consistent. 
 
4.4.3  Mediation analysis in the overall dataset 
Before examining the mediating role of effort in the separate consistency 
conditions, I conduct the analysis using the overall dataset. Panel D of Table 5 shows 
the main and interactive effects of quantity, consistency, and Predtime on confidence. 
While the main effect of Predtime is significant (F = 12.19; p = 0.001), the main effect 
of quantity, though smaller, remains significant (F = 4.29; p = 0.023), indicating that 
effort does not completely mediate the effect of quantity on confidence in the overall 
dataset (a fully mediating role would be shown if the effect of quantity on confidence 
were reduced or eliminated when effort is added to the analysis). The table also 
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reveals a significant Predtime × Consistency interaction (F = 4.02; p = 0.023). This 
interaction is shown graphically in Panel C of Figure 3, which shows, contrary to the 
literature cited earlier, a negative trend in confidence as Predtime increases. Consistent 
with the graph, simple effects tests (shown in Panels E and F of Table 5) show that the 
effect of Predtime on confidence is significantly negative in the high consistency 
condition, but is not significant in the low consistency condition.
17
 
4.4.4  Mediation analysis in the high and low consistency conditions 
The theory presented earlier suggests that while effort may mediate the effect 
of quantity on confidence in the low consistency condition, it is unlikely to do so in 
the high consistency condition. Therefore, I conduct mediation analysis separately for 
each consistency condition. Specifically, I examine the two links of the mediation 
relationship—the link between quantity and effort, and the subsequent link between 
effort and confidence—at both high and low levels of consistency.  
The results for the low consistency condition are shown in Panel E of Table 5. 
Quantity significantly affects Predtime (F = 7.90; p = 0.004), supporting the first link 
of the mediation relationship. However, the effect of Predtime on confidence is not 
significant (F = 1.32; p = 0.125), failing to support the second link of the mediation 
relationship. Not surprisingly, then, the effect of quantity on confidence remains 
significant (F = 2.92; p = 0.048) when Predtime is added to the analysis.  
The results for the high consistency condition are shown in Panel F of Table 5. 
As mentioned earlier, the effect of quantity on Predtime is not significant (F = 0.04; 
p = 0.419), failing to support the first link of the mediation relationship. Thus, 
Predtime could not mediate the effect of quantity on confidence in the high 
                                                 
17 This result is supported by Pearson correlation statistics, which show a Predtime-confidence 
correlation that is not signficantly different from zero in the low consistency condition (r = −0.080; 
p = 0.147), but is significantly negative in the high consistency condition (r = −0.206; p = 0.001). 
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consistency condition (as expected), as the variables fail to meet a premise for 
mediation analysis (i.e., that the independent variable significantly affect the proposed 
mediating variable).  
In summary, the mediation relationship breaks down in the low consistency 
condition due to an insignificant Predtime-confidence relationship (the second link), 
while the mediation relationship breaks down in the high consistency condition due to 
an insignificant quantity-Predtime relationship (the first link). I find no evidence that 
effort mediates the effect of signal quantity on unsophisticated investors’ judgment 
confidence.
18  
 
4.5      DISCUSSION 
  The results of experiment 2 show that while an increase in signal quantity 
increases both effort and confidence in the low consistency condition, effort and 
confidence are not positively related. Therefore, cognitive effort does not mediate the 
positive effect of quantity on confidence when information is directionally 
inconsistent.  
  Previous research that shows a positive relationship between task effort and 
confidence has held the task itself constant, and assessed the relationship either by 
soliciting effort ratings as a measured independent variable (see Yates and Kulick 
1977) or by manipulating incentives to affect the effort exerted by subjects (see Shaw 
and Zerr 2003). In contrast, effort is manipulated in this study by directly altering 
characteristics of the task (namely, complexity). The negative relationship between 
effort and confidence that I find in this study therefore suggests that the relationship 
                                                 
18 When investors’ ratings of effort or complexity are used as the effort measure, the conclusions 
regarding mediation are similar, with the results differing in the following ways: while Predtime is 
insignificantly negatively correlated with confidence in the low consistency condition, Effort and 
Complexity are both significantly negatively correlated with confidence. Thus, regardless of quantity, 
confidence is inversely related to these measures of perceived effort in the low consistency condition.  
These results indicate that the lack of mediation is not due to investors’ perceptions of effort differing 
from the effort revealed by the time-based effort proxy. 
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between effort and confidence may be positive only when the task is held constant 
(i.e., the harder one works, the better one’s perceived performance, all else equal). 
When effort increases due to changes in the task itself, the relationship between effort 
and confidence appears to be negative.
19   
  The pattern of results also suggests that the process by which the quantity of 
information affects judgment confidence differs depending on the consistency of the 
information. When information is consistent, increasing signal quantity leads to 
increased confidence in a straightforward manner. Specifically, investors appear to 
perceive their accuracy by the strength of the case for one security value over another. 
Thus, when a consistent information set becomes larger, their confidence is increased. 
The results regarding effort suggest that, if anything, effort is reduced when consistent 
information is increased, yet confidence is increased because of the relatively low 
effort required to reach a judgment.  
  When information is inconsistent, increasing signal quantity increases both 
cognitive effort and confidence, yet effort and confidence are unrelated. Investors’ 
confidence in this condition appears to be less negatively affected by effort, possibly 
due to the greater complexity of the task. In other words, investors exert more effort 
when signal quantity increases, but because the task is more complex, they may feel 
the additional effort necessary to achieve some confidence in their response. Thus, the 
complexity of the task in the low consistency condition may offset the negative effects 
of effort on confidence. 
  The failure of cognitive effort to mediate the quantity-confidence relationship 
supports the argument that the relationship represents a pure “quantity effect,” in 
which judgment confidence is increased directly by the fact that judgments are made 
                                                 
19 This result is consistent with research that shows a negative relationship between task difficulty and 
confidence (Lichtenstein and Fischoff 1977). In this study, Difficulty and Confidence were negatively 
correlated (r = −0.31, p = 0.001), while Difficulty and Predtime were positively correlated (r = 0.183, 
 55 
using a greater quantity of information, even if that information is inconsistent. This is 
consistent with the simpler psychological theory that the quantity of information 
drives the richness of an individual’s mental representation of a target, and thus 
directly affects the confidence he or she feels in judgments about that target (Gill, 
Swann, and Silvera 1998; Oskamp 1965). The results presented here suggest that this 
effect occurs even when the information is directionally inconsistent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
p = 0.001). Thus, when increased effort is induced by an increase in task difficulty, the effort-
confidence relationship appears to be negative.  
  
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines a financial reporting environment in which the 
quantity of information increases, but its overall quality does not. Managers in such a 
setting are likely to disclose low-quality information that is consistent in its 
implications. The results show that unsophisticated investors are more confident and 
more aggressive when information quantity and consistency are greater, holding 
information quality constant. Unsophisticated investors transfer more wealth to 
sophisticated investors when they have more low-quality information, and their wealth 
is higher (lower) when their information is consistent and directionally accurate 
(inaccurate).  
  The goal of many recent calls for increased disclosure is to improve the 
judgments and decisions of unsophisticated investors (SEC 2000). However, my 
results suggest that investors who lack knowledge of information quality may actually 
suffer reduced welfare as a result of increased disclosure, because the higher 
information quantity and consistency that is likely under increased disclosure 
encourages higher confidence and more aggressive trading. Investors who fall prey to 
these effects may benefit from relying on summary information provided by 
information intermediaries such as financial analysts, rather than on the voluminous 
disclosure coming directly from firms (Elliott, Hodge, and Jackson 2005; SIA 2001). 
Unsophisticated investors relied heavily on information quantity when 
assessing confidence. While predicted by the relevant psychology literature, this 
reliance was at times unambiguously irrational; e.g., when investors responded to a 
higher quantity of conflicting information by providing more extreme reservation 
prices. The results of experiment 2 suggest that this effect is direct, and not mediated 
by the effort exerted by investors. This result has implications for our understanding of 
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the factors that affect confidence. Prior research in behavioral finance suggests that an 
investor will be more confident about assessments “with which he has greater personal 
involvement” (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998, p. 1841), indicating a 
possible role for effort in determining confidence. While such a role may exist, the 
results of experiment 2 suggest that confidence can be affected more directly by 
changes in the quantity of information.  
Unsophisticated investors also relied heavily on directional agreement of 
signals when making their predictions—their confidence was significantly higher as 
signal consistency increased. This result differs from the results of Peterson and Pitz 
(1987), who find that the effect of information quantity on confidence is not 
influenced by consistency. Features of the task in this study (e.g., difficulty in 
interpreting signals and assessing diagnosticity, binary prediction) may have made the 
consistency of the signals a salient feature to which unsophisticated investors attended 
and on which they relied. This reliance suggests that unsophisticated investors may be 
particularly vulnerable to manipulation in fraud settings in which managers disclose 
information that paints a consistent but nondiagnostic picture of the firm.  
  Using a simulated, single-period market offers advantages and disadvantages 
for examining welfare effects. This approach allows me to collect twenty-four 
observations from each investor, without observing the correlated behavior that would 
occur over multiple rounds of interaction and feedback, and also allows me to focus on 
the more immediate effects of changes in the information environment on 
unsophisticated investors. In this sense, the experiment is consistent with the judgment 
and decision making literature, which tends to examine one-time judgments and 
behavior. Also, a common criticism of experimental markets is that evidence of 
irrational trading by disadvantaged investors may be attributable to the fact that there 
is little else for them to do while waiting for trading rounds to end. The single-period 
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market eliminates this explanation because investors work at their own pace, moving 
immediately to another firm when finished with the previous one. However, the 
single-period market has the disadvantage of not allowing investors to learn from the 
feedback that would be available in a setting with repeated interaction, and may 
therefore not reflect market conditions that could obtain over time. Multi-period 
markets also facilitate noise reduction as investors grow accustomed to market 
interactions. Examining whether these effects persist in multi-period markets thus 
offers a useful direction for future research.  
  Other limitations of this dissertation present additional opportunities for future 
research. First, in the experiments, unsophisticated investors receive more information 
in the high-quantity condition, but they also receive the same quantity of information 
that sophisticated investors receive. I therefore am unable to determine whether the 
increases in confidence and aggressiveness arise due to the increase in absolute 
information quantity, relative information quantity, or both. Given that Reg FD 
purportedly increases both absolute and relative information quantity, assessing their 
separate effects is not the main focus of this study. Intuitively, however, the increase 
in unsophisticated investors’ confidence would be likely to arise from the increase in 
absolute information (because more information suggests more accurate predictions), 
while the increase in aggressiveness would be likely to arise from the increase in 
relative information (because information equivalence suggests knowledge 
equivalence on a “level informational playing field”). Future research could examine 
this prediction.  
  Cognitive effort was not found to fully mediate the effect of information 
quantity on judgment confidence in the low consistency condition. Another possible 
explanation for this result relates to confirmation bias. Research in psychology finds 
that individuals tend to focus on evidence that confirms a preferred position and 
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discount evidence that disconfirms that position (Fischoff and Beyth-Marom 1983; 
Klayman and Ha 1987). Under this explanation, investors select a “preferred” signal, 
one to which they ascribe more weight when making judgments. In the AB condition, 
that signal stands alone in suggesting a security value. However, in the AABB 
condition, that signal is joined directionally by another, strengthening the investor’s 
confidence that the security takes the suggested value, and therefore increasing the 
extremity of their reservation prices. Future research could examine this possibility.  
Another avenue for future research involves the role of information load in 
affecting judgment confidence. A great deal of research in psychology and other areas 
has examined the effects of information load on task performance, generally finding 
that performance decreases as information load increases beyond some threshold of 
information processing capacity (Paredes 2003). However, the effects of information 
load on judgment confidence are less clear, and have not been studied as extensively. 
Such effects are beyond the scope of the studies reported here, which use relatively 
low quantities of information (two vs. four signals) specifically to avoid information 
overload effects. In many settings (such as that used in this study), however, judgment 
confidence can be as important in determining overall performance as judgment 
accuracy. The effect of information load on confidence is therefore an interesting 
direction for future research.  
This dissertation also offers directions for archival research on the effects of 
Reg FD. The effect of information quantity on unsophisticated investors’ trading 
aggressiveness suggests that the largest pre- vs. post-FD difference in small trade 
volume should be observed for those firms that show the largest post-FD increase in 
the amount of public information they disclose. Also, my results suggest that 
unsophisticated investors may be worse off financially if the post-FD increase in 
quantity has not been matched by an increase in quality. An archival analysis of 
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individual investor trade data could shed light on whether the welfare of 
unsophisticated investors is impaired in the post-FD environment, and whether it 
exhibits the effects found in this study.  
Finally, the role of effort in determining confidence appears to be an 
interesting area for researchers interested in the trading behaviors of different investor 
types. In contrast to literature showing a positive effort-confidence relationship, effort 
in my experiments had a negative impact on investors’ confidence. As mentioned 
earlier, this negative relation appears to emerge when effort is affected by actual 
changes in the task (as opposed to other changes, such as incentives). Future studies 
could expand this research by examining how effort and confidence affect market-
level variables such as price and volatility, as well as whether and how the relations 
among information quantity, effort, and confidence change over time and across levels 
of investor sophistication and experience.  
  
APPENDIX 1.  
Consent forms for experiments 1 and 2 
 
  This appendix contains the consent forms used in experiments 1 and 2. 
Experiment 1 was conducted at Brigham Young University, and experiment 2 was 
conducted at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Differences between the 
two consent forms reflect the different requirements of each university’s human 
subjects committee. 
 
 [CAPITALIZED, ITALICIZED COMMENTS IN SQUARE PARENTHESES ARE FOR CLARIFICATION 
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[EXPERIMENT 1 CONSENT FORM, PAGE 1 OF 1] 
 
Consent to be a Research Subject 
Introduction 
This research study is being conducted by Steven Smith of Cornell University. You were selected 
to participate because you are a member of the Marriott School community with previous 
coursework in Financial Accounting.  
 
Procedures 
If you agree to participate in this study, each participant will review varying amounts of accounting 
information for a number of firms, make predictions about future performance, and make security 
trading decisions. We expect this session to last about 1 ½ hours. 
 
Risks and Benefits 
We do not anticipate any risks to you from participating in this study, other than those you 
encounter in day-to-day life. We expect you to benefit directly by learning more about financial 
markets. We also expect other indirect benefits, because the results will enhance regulators’ and 
investors’ understanding of how to regulate and behave in financial markets. Your decision 
whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University or 
any members of the University community.  
 
Confidentiality 
All information provided will remain confidential and will only be reported as group data with no 
identifying information. All data will be kept in password-protected files and only those directly 
involved with the research will have access to them. After the research is completed, any personal 
information will be destroyed.  
 
Compensation 
You will receive a minimum of $5 for completing the task. You will also receive cash payments 
based on your performance at the security trading task. We expect the average payment to be about 
$20. 
 
Participation 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime or 
refuse to participate entirely without jeopardy to your class status, grade or standing with the 
university.  
 
Questions about the Research 
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Steven Smith at (607) 255-2671, 
sds25@cornell.edu or Jeff Wilks at (801) 422-1728, jeff_wilks@byu.edu. 
 
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants 
If you have questions you do not feel comfortable asking the researcher, you may contact Dr. 
Shane Schulthies, IRB Chair, 422-5490, 120B RB, shane_schulthies@byu.edu. 
 
I have read, understood, and received a copy of the above consent and desire of my own free will 
and volition to participate in this study. 
 
S i g n a t u r e :         Date:      
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[EXPERIMENT 2 CONSENT FORM, PAGE 1 OF 1] 
 
Consent to be a Research Participant 
Introduction 
This research study is being conducted by Professor Steven Smith of the University of Illinois. 
You were selected to participate because you are enrolled in an accounting program at UIUC. If 
you agree to participate in this study, you will review accounting information for a number of 
firms, make predictions about future performance, and make security trading decisions. We expect 
this session to last about 1½ hours. 
 
Risks and Benefits 
We do not anticipate any risks to you from participating in this study, other than those you 
encounter in day-to-day life. We expect you to benefit directly by learning more about financial 
markets. We also expect other indirect benefits, because the results will enhance regulators’ and 
investors’ understanding of how to regulate and behave in financial markets. Your decision 
whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future standing with the University or 
any members of the University community.  
 
Confidentiality 
All information provided will remain confidential and will only be reported as group data with no 
identifying information. All data will be kept in password-protected files and only those directly 
involved with the research will have access to them. After the research is completed, any personal 
information will be destroyed.  
 
Compensation 
You will receive a minimum of $5 for completing the task. You will also receive cash payments 
based on your performance at the security trading task. We expect the average payment to be in the 
range of $18 to $20. 
 
Participation 
Participation in this research study is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime or 
refuse to participate entirely without jeopardy to your class status, grade or standing with the 
university. However, if you do leave before completing the task, you will not be eligible for 
compensation.   
 
Questions about the Research 
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Professor Steven Smith by phone at 
(217) 265-6770, or by email at smithsd@uiuc.edu. 
 
Questions about your Rights as a Research Participant 
Questions about your rights as a research participant should be directed to the UIUC Institutional 
Review Board by phone at 333-2670, or by email at irb@uiuc.edu. 
 
I have read, understood, and received a copy of the above consent and desire of my own free will 
and volition to participate in this study. 
 
Please print name:  ________________________________________________________ 
 
S i g n a t u r e :         Date:     
 
This research is approved by the Institutional Review Board until           November 4, 2005. 
 
  
APPENDIX 2. 
Experimental materials: Envelope 1 
 
  This appendix shows the materials investors received in Envelope 1 of both 
experiments. These materials were identical across all conditions and experiments. 
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[EXPERIMENT MATERIALS: ENVELOPE 1, PAGE 1 OF 3] 
 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY 
 
During this session, you will do the following: 
 
1.  Review accounting information for a firm for a certain year. 
 
2.  Predict whether that firm’s Return on Equity (ROE = Income/Average Stockholders’ 
Equity) in the next year will be above or below the median ROE of all public firms. 
 
3.  Indicate a price (called a “cutoff price”) below which you would be willing to buy 
securities of the firm, and above which you would be willing to sell securities of the firm. 
 
4.  Indicate the number of shares you would like to trade (buy/sell). The trading decisions of 
all investors in this session will be analyzed to determine a market price for the firm, and 
buy and sell transactions will be executed at that price. Your payment for this session will 
be determined by your trading decisions.  
 
You will complete these 4 steps for 24 separate firms.  
 
We will now explain the 4 steps in more detail. 
 
1.  The Firms and the Information 
 
The firms come from a database of all public firms during the years 1998 through 2002. Any 
firm-year in which ROE was not positive was eliminated. We also eliminated all firms for 
which the necessary accounting information was missing. The 24 firms you will evaluate are a 
representative sample of the database. You will receive accounting information for each firm 
to assist you in making predictions about that firm’s future ROE.  
 
For each firm, you will receive a list of accounting information items for a given year (called 
the “current” year). The list will include percentile values of certain annual financial statement 
accounts and ratios. For example, if the firm’s Change in Gross Margin Ratio is greater than 
34% of all other firms in the current year, then the value for that measure is 34.  
 
2.  Predicting Above- or Below-Median ROE 
 
After reviewing the information, you will be asked to predict whether that firm’s ROE in the 
next year (called “future ROE”) will be above or below the median ROE of all firms in the 
next year (called “median ROE”). Because you are predicting whether a firm’s future ROE 
will be greater or less than the median ROE of all firms in that year, about half of the firms 
will be above and half will be below.  
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[EXPERIMENT MATERIALS: ENVELOPE 1, PAGE 1 OF 3] 
 
If you received no information at all and had to guess about each firm, you would be correct 
about 50% of the time. The information items provided can be used to help you increase your 
prediction accuracy.  
 
3.  Your Cutoff Price 
 
After making your prediction, you will be asked to make buy and sell decisions for securities 
of each firm. For each firm, shares are worth $1 each if the firm’s future ROE is above median 
ROE, and $0 if future ROE is below median ROE. The amount is referred to as the security’s 
“true value”. For each security, the decisions of all the investors will establish a “market 
price,” and trades (buys and sells) will be executed at that market price.  
 
Your first decision for each security is your “cutoff price,” which is the price at which you are 
indifferent between buying and selling shares. If the market price is below your cutoff price, 
you will buy shares of the security; if the market price is above your cutoff price, you will sell 
shares of the security. Therefore, you should set your cutoff price equal to what you believe is 
the probability that the firm’s future ROE will be above median ROE. For example, if you 
believe the probability that a firm’s future ROE will exceed median ROE is 75%, you should 
set your cutoff price at $0.75, because you would expect to make money by buying shares at 
market prices below $0.75 and selling shares at market prices above $0.75. All market prices 
will be between $0 and $1. 
 
4.  Number of Shares to Trade 
 
Your second decision for each security is the number of shares (between 0 and 10) you are 
willing to buy when market prices are below your cutoff price or sell when prices are above 
your cutoff price. For example, if your cutoff price is $0.75 and you indicate “8” as your 
number of shares, you are indicating that you are willing to buy 8 shares at market prices less 
than $0.75 and sell 8 shares at market prices greater than $0.75. Note that indicating a greater 
number of shares means you can win more money if your prediction is right, but that you can 
lose more money if your prediction is wrong.  
 
Trading and the Market Price 
 
The cutoff prices and share numbers of all the investors in this session will be collected and 
entered into a computer. The computer will use the information to compute a “market-clearing 
price,” which is the price at which supply equals demand (i.e., the price at which the number 
of shares offered by sellers equals the number of shares wanted by buyers) for each security. 
All buy and sell transactions will be executed at this market price. If there is a range of 
market-clearing prices, the midpoint of that range is used as the market price. 
 
There is only one trading session for each security. Therefore, after entering your cutoff price 
and share number for a security, you will immediately move on to the next firm. The 
determination of the market price and the execution of buys and sells will be conducted after 
the session. You will not learn the true values of the securities during the session. 
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[EXPERIMENT MATERIALS: ENVELOPE 1, PAGE 1 OF 3] 
 
How to Make Money  
 
After the session is completed, a record of all transactions will be made, and the cash and 
share balances of each investor will be determined for each security. All shares of each 
security will be converted into their true cash values ($0 or $1), and trading gains and losses 
for each participant will be computed. You earn money every time you buy a share for less 
than its true value or sell a share for more than its true value. You lose money every time you 
buy a share for more than its true value or sell a share for less than its true value. So, if you 
bought securities at a market clearing price of $0.55, you made $0.45 if the true value of the 
securities was $1, but lost $0.55 if the true value of the securities was $0. If you sold securities 
at a market clearing price of $0.55, you made $0.55 if the true value of the securities was $0, 
but lost $0.45 if the true value of the securities was $1.  
 
Remember that trades are executed at the market-clearing price, not at your cutoff 
price. For example, if your cutoff price is $0.75 and the market clearing price is $0.55, your 
“buy” transactions will be executed at $0.55.  
 
Your winnings in laboratory dollars will be converted to U.S. dollars. You will be paid a flat 
rate, adjusted to reflect your gains or losses. We anticipate an average payment of $15 per 
participant. Each participant is guaranteed to earn at least $5 for completing the session.  
 
The Investors 
 
There are two types of investors in this session. “Type 1” investors receive 2 items of 
accounting information for each firm; “Type 2” investors receive those same two items of 
information plus 2 additional items (a total of 4) for each firm. In addition, at the beginning of 
the session, Type 2 investors will receive some guidance about the explanatory power of all 
investors’ information. Type 1 investors do not receive any guidance. Investor type is assigned 
randomly; you will learn which type you have been assigned in the next envelope. 
 
In this session, 2/3 of the investors are Type 1 investors and 1/3 of the investors are Type 2 
investors.  
 
 
 
PLEASE REFRAIN FROM TALKING OR COMMUNICATING WITH OTHERS 
DURING THIS SESSION. 
 
 
 
PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO THE NEXT ENVELOPE. YOU MAY REFER TO THE 
MATERIAL IN THIS ENVELOPE AT ANY TIME. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 3. 
Experimental materials: Envelope 2 
 
  This appendix shows the materials investors received in Envelope 2 of both 
experiments. In this envelope, investors received information about their assigned type 
(“Type1”, referring to unsophisticated investors, or “Type 2”, referring to 
sophisticated investors) and the information signals they would receive for each firm.  
  The quantity of signals received by unsophisticated investors was manipulated 
within subjects at either two (low quantity) or four (high quantity), and this 
manipulation was counterbalanced in both experiments. This appendix shows the 
Envelope 2 information received by unsophisticated investors who began the 
experiment in the low quantity condition.  
  
[CAPITALIZED, ITALICIZED COMMENTS IN SQUARE PARENTHESES ARE FOR CLARIFICATION 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: ENVELOPE 2 (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS), PAGE 1 OF 1] 
 
 
 
YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF A TYPE 1 INVESTOR IN THIS 
SESSION. 
 
 
TYPE 1 INVESTOR INFORMATION 
 
The information items for each firm are that firm’s percentile values. “Percentile values” 
means that the numbers represent where the actual values of the information item lie relative 
to the values of all other firms in the most recent fiscal year, on a scale from 0 to 99. For 
example, if a firm’s percentage change in Gross Margin Ratio was higher than the percentage 
change of 42% of all other firms in the most recent fiscal year, the value for that measure will 
be 42.  
 
You will receive the following two items of accounting information for each firm: 
 
1.  The current year’s ratio of Cash from Operations (CFO) to Long-term Debt (CFO / 
Average Long-term Debt). 
 
2.  The percentage change in Gross Margin Ratio ((Net Sales – COGS) / Net Sales) during 
the current year. 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: ENVELOPE 2 (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS), PAGE 1 OF 1] 
 
 
 
YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF A TYPE 2 INVESTOR IN THIS 
SESSION. 
 
 
TYPE 2 INVESTOR INFORMATION 
 
The information items for each firm are that firm’s percentile values. “Percentile values” 
means that the numbers represent where the actual values of the information item lie relative 
to the values of all other firms in the most recent fiscal year, on a scale from 0 to 99. For 
example, if a firm’s percentage change in Gross Margin Ratio was higher than the percentage 
change of 42% of all other firms in the most recent fiscal year, the value for that measure will 
be 42.  
 
You will receive the following four items of accounting information for each firm: 
 
1.  The current year’s ratio of Cash from Operations (CFO) to Long-term Debt (CFO / 
Average Long-term Debt). 
 
2.  The percentage change in Gross Margin Ratio ((Net Sales – COGS) / Net Sales) during 
the current year. 
 
3.  The current year’s Inventory Turnover Ratio (COGS / Average Inventory). 
 
4.  The percentage change in Working Capital (Current Assets – Current Liabilities) during 
the current year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 4. 
Experimental materials: “Sophisticated” investors’ guidance 
 
  This appendix shows the guidance received by sophisticated (i.e., “Type 2”) 
investors. Sophisticated investors received information (in Envelope 2) about the 
diagnosticity (i.e., quality) of their signals, as well as that of the signals received by 
unsophisticated investors.  
  The guidance differed depending on whether sophisticated investors would be 
initially trading with unsophisticated investors in the low or high quantity conditions. 
This appendix shows the guidance received by sophisticated investors who initially 
traded with unsophisticated investors in the low quantity condition. 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS’ GUIDANCE (PAGE 1 OF 1)] 
 
GUIDANCE (TYPE 2 INVESTORS ONLY) 
 
Type 1 investors receive only items 1 and 2 from the list on the previous page (CFO to LT Debt 
Ratio and percentage change in Gross Margin Ratio). They do not receive the Inventory Turnover 
Ratio and percentage change in Working Capital information items. They also do not know what 
information items Type 2 investors receive. 
 
Some information items are more helpful than others for making your prediction. The following 
tables indicate the usefulness of the information items Type 1 and Type 2 investors receive.  
 
Usefulness of Type 2 Investors’ Information 
Accounting measure  Correlation with 
prediction variable  
Percentage of 
correct prediction 
when using the 
measure perfectly 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio  0.439 72% 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio  0.087 59% 
Inventory Turnover Ratio   0.080 59% 
Percentage Change in Working Capital   0.060 59% 
    
Entire information set (all 4 items)  0.454 72% 
 
Usefulness of Type 1 Investors’ Information 
Accounting measure  Correlation with 
prediction variable  
Percentage of 
correct prediction 
when using the 
measure perfectly 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio  0.439 72% 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio  0.087 59% 
    
Entire information set  0.450 72% 
 
The second column of each table gives the correlation between each item and the 
prediction variable (whether future ROE will be above or below average ROE). Positive 
correlation indicates that as the accounting information item increases, so does expected ROE. 
Negative correlation indicates that as the accounting information item increases, expected ROE 
decreases. Values close to 1 or −1 indicate very high correlation between two variables, while 
values near 0 indicate little or no correlation. 
The third column gives the percent of correct predictions you can expect to achieve if you 
use the information item perfectly. The closer an item’s percentage is to 50%, the less likely it is to 
provide meaningful information about the prediction variable.  
At the bottom of each table, the correlation and percentage correct are given for the total 
information set. 
 
REMEMBER: Type 1 investors do not receive any guidance regarding their information or 
yours. This means that they do not know the specific usefulness of each information item. As 
a result, they are probably more likely to consider each item to be equally important.  
 
  
APPENDIX 5. 
Experimental materials: Comprehension check questions 
 
  This appendix shows the comprehension check questions investors were asked 
after reading the instructions and learning their assigned investor type but before 
proceeding to evaluate the individual firms. In addition to being asked the same 
questions unsophisticated investors were asked, sophisticated investors were asked a 
few more questions related to the guidance they had received.  
  Investors in experiment 1 received these questions on paper. Because there was 
no way to check their accuracy before allowing them to proceed, the answers to the 
questions were provided on the following page, and investors were encouraged to 
make sure their answers were correct before proceeding. Investors in experiment 2 
received the questions on computer; therefore, the program was able to check each 
investor’s accuracy. Investors in experiment 2 were not allowed to proceed until they 
had provided the correct answer to each question.  
  This appendix shows the comprehension check questions for unsophisticated 
and sophisticated investors in experiment 1.   
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS (UNSOPHISTICATED 
INVESTORS) (PAGE 1 OF 2)] 
 
COMPREHENSION CHECK 
 
It is important that you understand these instructions before beginning. Please answer the 
following questions to demonstrate your understanding. The questions are very simple, if you 
understand the instructions. Please make sure your answers are correct. You may refer back to 
find the answers, and there is an answer key on the next page. 
 
1.  True or False: You will be predicting whether a firm’s future Return on Equity (ROE) will 
be above or below the median ROE for all firms in a given year. 
______________________ 
 
2.  In this session, are you a Type 1 investor or a Type 2 investor? 
_______________________ 
 
3.  How many information items will you receive for each firm? 
_________________________ 
 
4.  How many information items will the other type of investor receive for each firm? 
________ 
 
5.  True or False: The information items you will receive represent the actual raw values of 
the financial statement accounts and ratios for each firm. 
________________________________ 
 
6.  True or False: Type 2 investors receive guidance about the explanatory power of all 
investors’ information. _____________________________ 
 
7.  True of False: Type 1 investors receive guidance about the explanatory power of their own 
information, but not about the information of Type 2 investors. 
________________________ 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS (UNSOPHISTICATED 
INVESTORS) (PAGE 2 OF 2)] 
 
Comprehension Check Answer Key 
 
1.  True 
2.  Type 1 investor 
3.  2 items 
4.  4 items 
5.  False – they represent percentile values. 
6.  True 
7.  False – Type 1 investors do not receive guidance about the explanatory power of any 
investor’s information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU MAY NOW OPEN THE NEXT ENVELOPE AND BEGIN WORKING ON THE 
SECURITIES. YOU MAY REFER TO THE MATERIAL IN THIS ENVELOPE AT 
ANY TIME. 
 
 
 
PLEASE WORK THROUGH THE SECURITIES IN THE ORDER THEY ARE 
PRESENTED. ALSO, ONCE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS FOR 
A SECURITY, PLEASE DO NOT GO BACK TO IT. 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS (SOPHISTICATED 
INVESTORS) (PAGE 1 OF 2)] 
 
COMPREHENSION CHECK 
 
It is important that you understand these instructions before beginning. Please answer the 
following questions to demonstrate your understanding. The questions are very simple, if you 
understand the instructions. Please make sure your answers are correct. You may refer back to 
find the answers, and there is an answer key on the next page. 
  
1.  True or False:  You will be predicting whether a firm’s future Return on Equity (ROE) 
will be above or below the median ROE for all firms in a given year. 
______________________ 
 
2.  In this session, are you a Type 1 investor or a Type 2 investor?  
_______________________ 
 
3.  How many information items will you receive for each firm? 
_________________________ 
 
4.  How many information items will the other type of investor receive for each firm? 
________ 
 
5.  True or False: The information items you will receive represent the actual raw values of 
the financial statement accounts and ratios for each firm. 
________________________________ 
 
6.  True or False:  Type 2 investors receive guidance about the explanatory power of all 
investors’ information. _____________________________ 
 
7.  True of False: Type 1 investors receive guidance about the explanatory power of their own 
information, but not about the information of Type 2 investors. 
________________________ 
 
8.  Which information item is the most useful for predicting whether future ROE will be 
above or below median ROE? __________________________________ 
 
9.  For the information you receive, how much predictive power (in %) do the other three 
information items add to the one information item that is the most useful? 
_______________ 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS (SOPHISTICATED 
INVESTORS) (PAGE 2 OF 2)] 
 
Comprehension Check Answer Key 
 
1.  True 
2.  Type 2 investor 
3.  4 items   
4.  2 items 
5.  False – they represent percentile values. 
6.  True 
7.  False – Type 1 investors do not receive guidance about the explanatory power of any 
investor’s information. 
8.  CFO to LT Debt Ratio 
9.  0%.  
 
 
 
YOU MAY NOW OPEN THE NEXT ENVELOPE AND BEGIN WORKING ON THE 
SECURITIES. YOU MAY REFER TO THE MATERIAL IN THIS ENVELOPE AT 
ANY TIME. 
 
 
 
PLEASE WORK THROUGH THE SECURITIES IN THE ORDER THEY ARE 
PRESENTED. ALSO, ONCE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS FOR 
A SECURITY, PLEASE DO NOT GO BACK TO IT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 6. 
Experiment 1: Firm pages 
 
  This appendix shows the first firm page seen by investors in experiment 1, 
which was administered as a paper-and-pencil task. Unsophisticated investors received 
either two or four signals per firm, manipulated within subjects. Sophisticated 
investors received four signals per firm for all firms. This appendix shows the first 
firm page seen by unsophisticated investors who received two signals per firm for the 
first set of firms, and the corresponding first page seen by sophisticated investors. 
 
[CAPITALIZED, ITALICIZED COMMENTS IN SQUARE PARENTHESES ARE FOR CLARIFICATION 
PURPOSES ONLY AND DID NOT APPEAR ON THE PAGES READ BY INVESTORS.] 
 
78 79 
[EXPERIMENT 1: FIRM PAGES (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 1 OF 1)] 
 
FIRM 1 
 
You are given the following accounting information items for the current year for this firm. 
Remember, these are percentile values (i.e., the percentage of firms with lower values for 
these measures): 
 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio:          24 
 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio:    66 
 
 
 
REQUIRED 
 
1.  Prediction and Cutoff Price:  Please do the following: a) check one of the two boxes to 
indicate whether you believe the FUTURE ROE of this firm will be above or below the 
MEDIAN ROE of all public firms; b) indicate your cutoff price, which is the price at 
which you are indifferent between buying and selling shares of this security. Note: only 
check one box, and only provide a cutoff price for the alternative you choose. 
 
O O Check here if you predict ABOVE, and mark your cutoff price on the scale below: 
 
                             
                             
    $0.50    $0.55      $0.60      $0.65       $0.70       $0.75      $0.80       $0.85       $0.90     $0.95    $1.00 
 
-OR- 
 
O  Check here if you predict BELOW, and mark your cutoff price on the scale below: 
 
                             
                             
    $0.00   $0.05      $0.10      $0.15        $0.20       $0.25       $0.30       $0.35     $0.40      $0.45    $0.50 
 
 
2.  Number of Shares: Check the number of shares that you are willing to buy at market 
prices below your cutoff price and sell at market prices above your cutoff price (check 
only one number): 
 
O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O
         0           1            2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9         10 
            shares            shares 
 
 
YOU MAY REFER BACK TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AT ANY TIME, BUT         
PLEASE DO NOT GO BACK TO PREVIOUS FIRM PAGES. 
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[EXPERIMENT 1: FIRM PAGES (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 1 OF 1)] 
 
FIRM 1 
 
You are given the following accounting information items for the current year for this firm. 
Remember, these are percentile values (i.e., the percentage of firms with lower values for these 
measures): 
 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio:        24 
 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio:  66 
 
Inventory Turnover Ratio:      85 
 
Percentage Change in Working Capital:    99 
 
 
REQUIRED 
 
1.  Prediction and Cutoff Price:  Please do the following: a) check one of the two boxes to 
indicate whether you believe the FUTURE ROE of this firm will be above or below the 
MEDIAN ROE of all public firms; b) indicate your cutoff price, which is the price at which 
you are indifferent between buying and selling shares of this security. Note: only check one 
box, and only provide a cutoff price for the alternative you choose. 
 
O  Check here if you predict ABOVE, and mark your cutoff price on the scale below: 
 
                             
                             
    $0.50    $0.55      $0.60      $0.65       $0.70       $0.75      $0.80       $0.85       $0.90     $0.95    $1.00 
 
-OR- 
 
O  Check here if you predict BELOW, and mark your cutoff price on the scale below: 
 
                             
                             
    $0.00   $0.05      $0.10      $0.15        $0.20       $0.25       $0.30       $0.35     $0.40      $0.45    $0.50 
 
 
2.  Number of Shares: Check the number of shares that you are willing to buy at market prices 
below your cutoff price and sell at market prices above your cutoff price (check only one 
number): 
 
O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O     O O
0           1            2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9  10 
      shares                shares 
 
YOU MAY REFER BACK TO THE INSTRUCTIONS AT ANY TIME, BUT PLEASE DO 
NOT GO BACK TO PREVIOUS FIRM PAGES. 
 
  
APPENDIX 7. 
Experiment 2: Firm screens 
 
This appendix shows the seqence of screens that investors saw for each firm 
they evaluated in experiment 2, which was administed by computer. On the first 
screen, investors observed the signals and made their ABOVE/BELOW judgment. 
Based on that judgment, they were then taken to a second screen on which they 
indicated their reservation price. On the third screen investors indicated the number of 
shares they wished to trade. The fourth, fifth, and sixth screens elicited investors’ 
assessments of effort, difficulty, and complexity related to the evaluation of each firm. 
Finally, the seventh screen asked whether they would like to go back and re-evaluate 
the current firm or proceed to the next firm, where the process was repeated.  
This appendix shows the seven screens of the first firm seen by unsophisticated 
investors who received four signals per firm for the first set of firms. 
 
 
[CAPITALIZED, ITALICIZED COMMENTS IN SQUARE PARENTHESES ARE FOR CLARIFICATION 
PURPOSES ONLY AND DID NOT APPEAR ON THE PAGES READ BY INVESTORS.] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 1 OF 7)] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 2 OF 7)] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 3 OF 7)] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 4 OF 7)] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 5 OF 7)] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 6 OF 7)] 
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[EXPERIMENT 2: FIRM SCREENS (PAGE 7 OF 7)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 8. 
Experimental materials: Quantity manipulation 
 
  This appendix shows how investors were informed of the quantity 
manipulation in both experiments. Unsophisticated investors received two (four) 
signals for each of the first twelve firms they evaluated, followed by four (two) signals 
for each of the remaining twelve firms. Sophisticated investors received four signals 
for each of the 24 firms they evaluated. This appendix shows the quantity 
manipulation for unsophisticated investors who received two signals followed by four 
signals, as well as the guidance for the corresponding sophisticated investors. 
Additional comprehension check questions were given, and they are also shown. 
 
[CAPITALIZED, ITALICIZED COMMENTS IN SQUARE PARENTHESES ARE FOR CLARIFICATION 
PURPOSES ONLY AND DID NOT APPEAR ON THE PAGES READ BY INVESTORS.] 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: QUANTITY MANIPULATION (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) 
(PAGE 1 OF 2)] 
 
IMPORTANT 
 
FOR THE REMAINING 12 FIRMS, TYPE 1 INVESTORS WILL RECEIVE 4 
INFORMATION ITEMS INSTEAD OF 2. In addition to receiving the percentile values of 
a firm’s CFO to LT Debt Ratio and Change in Gross Margin Ratio, Type 1 investors will 
receive the following: 
 
The current year’s Inventory Turnover Ratio (COGS / Average Inventory). 
 
The percentage change in Working Capital (Current Assets – Current Liabilities) 
during the current year. 
 
Type 2 investors will continue to receive the same information they received for the first 12 
firms.  
 
Comprehension Check 
 
To ensure your understanding of these instructions, please answer the following 
questions (please make sure your answers are correct – the answer key is located on the next 
page). 
 
1.  How many information items did Type 1 investors receive for each firm up to this point? 
_____ 
 
2.  How many information items will Type 1 investors receive for each firm from now on?  
_____ 
 
3.  Will Type 2 investors’ information change for the remaining 12 firms? _____________ 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: QUANTITY MANIPULATION (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) 
(PAGE 2 OF 2)] 
 
Comprehension Check Answer Key 
 
1.  2 items 
2.  4 items 
3.  No 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU MAY NOW OPEN THE LAST ENVELOPE AND BEGIN WORKING ON THE 
REMAINING 12 SECURITIES. 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: QUANTITY MANIPULATION (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 
1 OF 2)] 
 
IMPORTANT 
 
FOR THE REMAINING 12 FIRMS, TYPE 1 INVESTORS WILL RECEIVE 4 
INFORMATION ITEMS INSTEAD OF 2.  In addition to receiving the percentile values of 
a firm’s CFO to LT Debt Ratio and Change in Gross Margin Ratio, Type 1 investors will 
receive the following: 
 
The current year’s Inventory Turnover Ratio (COGS / Average Inventory). 
 
The percentage change in Working Capital (Current Assets – Current Liabilities) 
during the current year. 
 
Type 2 investors will continue to receive the same information they received for the first 12 
firms.   
 
GUIDANCE (TYPE 2 INVESTORS ONLY) 
 
Type 1 investors will now receive the same information items that you receive. The following 
table indicates the usefulness of the information items all investors will receive. It is the same 
as the table you received earlier. 
 
REMEMBER: TYPE 1 INVESTORS DO NOT RECEIVE THIS TABLE. 
Accounting measure  Correlation with 
prediction variable  
Percentage of correct 
prediction when using 
the measure perfectly 
CFO to LT Debt Ratio  0.439 72% 
Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio  0.087 59% 
Inventory Turnover Ratio   0.080 59% 
Percentage Change in Working Capital   0.060 59% 
    
Entire information set (all 4 items)  0.454 72% 
 
C
 
omprehension Check 
To ensure your understanding of these instructions, please answer the following questions 
please make sure your answers are correct – the answer key is located on the next page).  (
 
1.  How many information items did Type 1 investors receive for each firm up to this point? 
_____ 
 
2.  How many information items will Type 1 investors receive for each firm from now on?  
______ 
 
3
 
.  Will Type 2 investors’ information change for the remaining 12 firms? ___________ 
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[EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS: QUANTITY MANIPULATION (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 
2 OF 2)] 
 
Comprehension Check Answer Key 
 
1.  2 items 
2.  4 items 
3.  No 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU MAY NOW OPEN THE LAST ENVELOPE AND BEGIN WORKING ON THE 
REMAINING 12 SECURITIES. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 9. 
Experimental materials: Debriefing questions 
 
  This appendix shows the debriefing questions investors in experiment 1 
answered after they evaluated all 24 firms in the experiment. The questions given to 
unsophisticated (sophisticated investors) are shown first (second).  
  With only small modifications, the debriefing questions given in experiment 2 
were the same as those given in experiment 1. This appendix shows the debriefing 
questions answered by unsophisticated and sophisticated investors in experiment 1.  
 
[CAPITALIZED, ITALICIZED COMMENTS IN SQUARE PARENTHESES ARE FOR CLARIFICATION 
PURPOSES ONLY AND DID NOT APPEAR ON THE PAGES READ BY INVESTORS.] 
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[EXPERIMENT 1:  DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 1 OF 3)] 
 
YOU HAVE FINISHED THE SESSION. 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BEFORE RETURNING YOUR 
MATERIALS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR. DO NOT GO BACK AND CHANGE ANY 
PREVIOUS ANSWERS. 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE 
 
Please indicate, on the scales given, the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
 
1.  I understood the instructions.   
 
      
                     
                     
Disagree       Agree 
2.  I understood the task.    
                     
                     
Disagree       Agree 
 
 
3.  How much of a disadvantage did you feel, relative to Type 2 investors, when you received 
2 information items for each firm? 
                     
                     
No Disadvantage   
Moderate 
Disadvantage    Large Disadvantage 
 
 
4.  How much of a disadvantage did you feel, relative to Type 2 investors, when you received 
4 information items for each firm? 
                     
                     
No Disadvantage   
Moderate 
Disadvantage    Large Disadvantage 
 
 
5.  Do you feel that your predictions were more or less accurate when you received 4 
information items compared to when you received 2 information items? 
                     
                     
Less Accurate   
No Effect on 
Accuracy    More Accurate 
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[EXPERIMENT 1:  DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 2 OF 3)] 
 
6.  Did you feel more or less confident in your predictions when you received 4 information 
items compared to when you received 2 information items? 
                     
                     
Less Confident   
No Effect on 
Confidence    More Confident 
 
 
7.  Did you feel more or less confident in your predictions when the information items were 
consistent (i.e., all or most of the values were either high or low) compared to when the 
information items were inconsistent (i.e., some high and some low)? 
                     
                     
Less Confident   
No Effect on 
Confidence    More Confident 
 
 
8.  Did you feel more or less willing to trade shares when you received 4 information items 
compared to when you received 2 information items? 
                     
                     
Less Willing to 
Trade   
No Effect on 
Willingness to Trade   
More Willing to 
Trade 
 
 
9.  Some of the information items you received were more relevant than others for predicting 
future ROE. Please rank the 4 information items you received according to your belief 
about the relevance of each item for predicting future ROE, where 1 = most relevant and 4 
= least relevant, or check the last box if you relied on each item equally.   
 
   CFO to LT Debt Ratio 
   Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio 
   Inventory Turnover Ratio 
  Percentage Change in Working Capital 
   I relied on each information item equally. 
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[EXPERIMENT 1:  DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS (UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 3 OF 3)] 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
 
10. Name of university  ____________________________ 
 
11. What is your student status? 
 
____  MBA Student  (what year?  _____ ) 
 
____  MAcc Student  (what year?  _____ ) 
  
 
12. How many accounting classes have you taken in total? _________________ 
 
 
13. Have you taken a course in Financial Statement Analysis? ______________ 
 
 
14. What is your age? ________________ 
 
 
15. What is your gender? ______________ 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. YOUR WINNINGS WILL BE 
CALCULATED AND YOU WILL RECEIVE AN EMAIL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW 
WEEKS INDICATING WHERE TO GO TO PICK UP YOUR PAYMENT. 
 
PLEASE RETURN ALL MATERIALS TO THE ENVELOPES FROM WHICH THEY 
CAME AND RETURN THEM TO THE ADMINISTRATOR.   
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[EXPERIMENT 1: DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 1 OF 3)] 
 
YOU HAVE FINISHED THE SESSION. 
   
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BEFORE RETURNING YOUR 
MATERIALS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR. DO NOT GO BACK AND CHANGE ANY 
PREVIOUS ANSWERS. 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE 
 
Please indicate, on the scales given, the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
 
1.  I understood the instructions.   
 
          
                     
                     
Disagree       Agree 
2.  I understood the task.    
                     
                     
Disagree       Agree 
 
 
3.  How much of an advantage did you feel, relative to Type 1 investors, when you received 4 
information items and they received 2 information items? 
                     
                     
No Advantage    Moderate Advantage    Large Advantage 
 
 
4.  How much of an advantage did you feel, relative to Type 1 investors, when all investors 
received 4 information items for each firm? 
                     
                     
No Advantage    Moderate Advantage    Large Advantage 
 
 
5.  Did you feel more or less willing to trade shares when Type 1 investors received 2 
information items, compared to when they received the same 4 information items that you 
received? 
                     
                     
Less Willing    Equally Willing    More Willing 
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[EXPERIMENT 1: DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 2 OF 3)] 
 
6.  Do you feel that your winnings will be greater or smaller for the firms for which Type 1 
investors received 2 information items, compared to your winnings for the firms for which 
Type 1 investors received the same 4 information items that you received? 
                     
                     
Smaller Winnings   
No Effect on 
Winnings    Greater Winnings 
 
 
7.  Which of the 4 information items you received did you rely on the most when making 
your predictions? (Check one) 
 
   CFO to LT Debt Ratio 
   Percentage Change in Gross Margin Ratio 
   Inventory Turnover Ratio 
  Percentage Change in Working Capital 
   I relied on all information items equally 
 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
 
8.  Name of university  ____________________________ 
 
9.  What is your student status? 
 
____  MBA Student  (what year?  _____ ) 
 
____  MAcc Student  (what year?  _____ ) 
  
 
10. How many accounting classes have you taken in total? _________________ 
 
 
11. Have you taken a course in Financial Statement Analysis? ______________ 
 
 
12. What is your age? ________________ 
 
 
13. What is your gender? ______________ 
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[EXPERIMENT 1: DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS (SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS) (PAGE 3 OF 3)] 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. YOUR WINNINGS WILL BE 
CALCULATED AND YOU WILL RECEIVE AN EMAIL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW 
WEEKS INDICATING WHERE TO GO TO PICK UP YOUR PAYMENT. 
 
PLEASE RETURN ALL MATERIALS TO THE ENVELOPES FROM WHICH THEY 
CAME AND RETURN THEM TO THE ADMINISTRATOR.   
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